

CURRENT *History*

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AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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CURRENT History

OCTOBER, 1964

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In this issue seven articles present an insight into the early development of American politics, the growth of the two-party system, and into the dominant political personalities and trends active in United States history up to the 1964 campaign. Capsulizing the early days of American politics, our first expert notes that after the original jousting between the Federalists and the Jeffersonians, "As far as the presidency was concerned, the country . . . passed into an era of one-party rule." This soon passed, however, and a more familiar pattern evolved in which any serious presidential aspirant faced "the problem of retaining the loyalty of his own section while meeting the different needs and interests of other sections."

American Politics: The First Half-Century

By LOUIS W. KOENIG

Professor of Government, New York University

IN THE FIRST half-century of its presidential elections, the American nation experienced the entire gamut of possible party organizations. At various times, the nation selected its presidents without parties, with one party, with two parties, and with many parties. It saw the rise and demise of two major parties—the Federalists and the Whigs—and the creation and meteoric progress of a further major party, the Republican, the party of Lincoln. It witnessed the founding of the most enduring of its major parties, the Democratic party, which emerged from Thomas Jefferson's "Republican" party.

Party change coincided more or less with basic changes in the nature of the country. Between 1789 and 1854, the United States was transformed from an agricultural country, whose sparse population was concentrated

on the eastern seaboard, into a bustling nation of commerce and manufacture, as well as agriculture, whose territory reached to the Mexican border and California. In the two wars it fought in this era, its goals were further territorial aggrandizement, northward and southward. Its parties took long strides from the localism of state and section to the cohesion of the nation. The cement of intersectional union was provided with supreme skill by career politicians and above all by aspirants to the presidency. It was likewise the party and the politician who transformed American politics from what it originally was—the preserve of the rich and the well-born—into an enterprise in which the vote and influence of the preponderance of citizens became controlling.

The first two elections to the presidency,

always the great prize of politics, were non-partisan events, thanks to the candidacy of the nation's incomparable hero, George Washington. Both elections witnessed an enduring feature of presidential politics, the balanced ticket. The President and Vice-President were chosen from different sections of the country: George Washington from Virginia and John Adams from Massachusetts. Washington was chosen unanimously, in the sense that he received one of the two votes that every elector cast under the existing constitutional procedure. Yet Adams' vote, which was the second highest and thereby captured the vice-presidency, was diminished by votes cast for ten other candidates. The wide distribution of the electors' second votes is attributed to the enterprise of Alexander Hamilton and his desire to make certain that Adams should not triumph over Washington for the presidency. Hamilton accordingly had sent out messages to several states urging that not all votes be cast for Adams.

The first election, in the selection of its electors, was dominated by the party that had championed the constitution in the struggle for its ratification, the Federalists. Whatever opposition there was emerged from the foes of the constitution, the Anti-Federalists. The sharpest struggle occurred in New York, where the Senate was Federalist and the Assembly Anti-Federalist, and the two houses could not agree on the manner in which the state's electors should be elected. New York consequently cast no electoral votes in the first election.

Politics was distasteful to Washington and he abhorred party spirit. Yet his administration, almost from the beginning, revealed Federalist tendencies. He gave no offices to the Anti-Federalists, fearful that they might hamper the new ship of state. The chief strategist and field commander of the Federalists, Alexander Hamilton, became the most powerful influence in the Administration. His Great Reports were the foundation of an array of policies making the central government a promoter of commerce, trade and manufacture; and the provider of fiscal policies to speed the nation's growth. The

central government, following Hamilton's plans, assumed responsibility for the Revolutionary War debts of the states, developed a structure of protective tariffs and excise taxes, and established a national bank.

This latter action brought a head-on clash between Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, and Congressman James Madison, who viewed the bank as a moneyed monopoly which would enhance the power of the financial oligarchy that seemed to be fastening upon the new government. Hamilton's chief opponent was Jefferson, Virginia planter and scientific farmer, who viewed the United States as a nation of farmers and aimed to keep it so. With land so plentiful, Jefferson believed that every man could become an owner; this would provide the best assurance of political democracy. As Europe had proved, manufacture and industry led to the evils of a congested urban population and a small ruling class.

AN OPPOSITION PARTY

The second election, in 1792, found Washington again the unanimous choice of the electors, and Adams the victor for Vice-President. This time, however, Adams' opponents were not fellow Federalists, but leading figures of the opposition, like George Clinton, Thomas Jefferson, and Aaron Burr. In the second administration, partisanship was aggravated by the French Revolution and war between Britain and France, with Hamilton and his fellow Federalists strongly partial to the former and Jefferson and his "Republicans," as his emerging party was known, devoted to the latter.

The fast-growing power of the new party was starkly evident in the 1796 election, the last Federalist triumph, in which John Adams secured a majority of electoral votes, with only one vote to spare. Even more significant, the candidate placing second among the thirteen who received votes for the presidency was Thomas Jefferson, Republican leader. The rise of parties, unanticipated by the Founding Fathers, now produced the bizarre spectacle of a Federalist President and a Republican Vice-President.

The surge of the Republicans was due in no small measure to the skill of their leader, Thomas Jefferson, in building political organization. In contrast to the Federalists, who possessed little organization, Jefferson developed a network of party units, reaching throughout the land. He cultivated ties with courthouse cliques, quietly entertained Virginia's leaders at his home, took over Patrick Henry's old Anti-Federalist party in Virginia, reached out to the back country of the Carolinas, to Southern planters resentful of Hamilton's financial program, to the new settlements of Ohio, Tennessee and Kentucky, to Pennsylvania, where Albert Gallatin was the party's principal spokesman, to the frontier of western New York, to the northern limits and the interior of the New England states. The farmer who resented his British creditor, the urban mechanic and laborer, and the frontier settler, were standard Republican types.

Jefferson and his party grew by a pattern which became routine for any future leader and party aspiring to enduring major impact. He served first as spokesman of the interests and ideals of a section and then, by building inter-personal group and sectional understandings, developed a national organization. Basic among Jefferson's activities was his famous "botanizing" excursion to New York State, from which emerged the long alliance between the Virginia planters and professional politicians of New York, including the Tammany leader, Aaron Burr.

The Republicans were also unified by the Alien Act of the Adams era, a partisan Federalist measure which was directed against immigrants who quickly gravitated to the Republican party, and the Sedition Act, aimed at Republican editors and writers. In lieu of the party platform (which had not yet been devised as an appeal to public opinion), the Republican party protested these laws through resolutions in state legislatures, most notably those of Kentucky and Virginia.

CAMPAIGN OF 1800

The election of 1800 enabled the now highly organized Republicans to capture the

presidency. The season for choosing electors was heralded by an intensive Republican campaign against the Adams administration, against its unconstitutional measures, militarism, high taxes, swelling debt—all indications of aristocratic rule, monarchical tendency, and the power of the "monied interest." The Republicans were further aided by disclosures from a pamphlet by Alexander Hamilton on the defects of John Adams.

The Federalists, in desperation, resorted to a campaign of fear and smear, depicting Jefferson as an infidel, a fanatic, a devotee of French revolutionary doctrine, who would give agriculture preference over commerce, renounce the national debt, and reduce the country to anarchy.

Both tickets were balanced in 1800. The Federalists presented Adams as a candidate for reelection to the presidency and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina for Vice-President, and the Republicans offered a ticket made up of Jefferson of Virginia and Aaron Burr of New York. Although the latter was understood to be the candidate for Vice-President, the outcome gave Jefferson and Burr 73 votes each, with 65 for Adams, Pinckney, 64 and John Jay, one.

The election was thrown into the House of Representatives, where Jefferson, after lengthy intensive Federalist-Republican maneuvering, ultimately prevailed. To avoid repetition of the 1800 election nightmare, the Twelfth Amendment was adopted, providing for separate election of the President and Vice-President.

"We are all republicans—we are all federalists," Jefferson declared in his inaugural. Aware that many Federalists had supported his election, he meant to hold them. Hamilton's financial system, except the excise tax structure, was not disturbed. Business prospered. Jefferson pursued his own principles of economy and simplicity in government, reduced the debt, and diminished the governmental influence of the "paper capitalists." His Louisiana Purchase was overwhelmingly popular.

Meanwhile, Jefferson was perfecting and controlling a party organization centering on

the congressional caucus of Republican legislators. New England Federalists frantically sought to stop Jefferson by moving to secede from the union. In the 1804 elections, with Jefferson's popularity at a peak, the Federalists provided only token resistance. Jefferson and his vice-presidential running mate, George Clinton, a venerable New Yorker who had replaced the departed Aaron Burr, swamped the Federalist ticket of Charles Pinckney (South Carolina) and Rufus King (New York).

The Federalist party was plainly in the twilight of its short-lived career. In the modern sense, it was never a party, but a vehicle by which a select ruling class exerted dominion over public affairs. The Federalists ensured their own demise by barring the influx of newcomers; they thus refused to adjust their membership to the country's growing population and its surge westward. For obvious reasons, the party was weakest in the newer settlements and among immigrants. Devoted to a European concept of aristocratic rule, the Federalists denied the legitimacy of the political party as an instrument for large-scale citizenry participation. Not surprisingly, they failed to create anything like a substantial party organization, since the notion that the great body of Federalist voters should share in the choice of party leaders and other decisions was utterly repugnant. The Federalists lost touch with the times and the people. This was sufficient cause to assure any party's disintegration.

After Jefferson's passing from the presidency, the Virginia succession continued in the persons of James Madison and James Monroe. As far as the presidency was concerned, the country had passed into an era of one-party rule. The Republican party, however, was no monolith, but an assemblage of factions, and when different factions controlled the President's desk and Congress, the two branches became locked in struggle.

Following the congressional elections of 1810, Congress witnessed the swift rise of the Young Republicans—Henry Clay of Kentucky, John Calhoun, Langdon Cheves, and William Lowndes of South Carolina,

and Felix Grundy of Tennessee. These men were westerners or from frontier areas, and they all articulated the intense nationalism and expansionism rampant in their local environments. They swiftly wrested control of the House of Representatives, installed Clay as Speaker, and dominated the congressional caucus which controlled the selection of the Republican presidential nominee.

When James Madison, to whom war was personally repugnant, took a warlike stance against Britain, he was thereupon renominated and reelected and the country was soon deep in the war of 1812. In 1816, the Young Republicans nearly blocked the nomination of James Monroe, Madison's heir apparent to the presidency, by mustering in the caucus 54 votes for their candidate, William H. Crawford of Georgia, compared with 65 for Monroe. The nomination of Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York for Vice-President perpetuated the old Virginia-New York alliance.

But this alliance was becoming outmoded in each advancing year, by the country's growth and the increasing subtleties of its sectional differences. The North-South split over slavery was sharply intensified. The peace which the Missouri Compromise cast upon that troubled sea proved only tentative. New England, the middle states, the old South, and the west Mississippi valley were pulling in different directions over the protective tariff, internal improvements and public lands. A fast-evolving new sectionalism ended the one-party system of the Monroe era and posed for the serious presidential aspirant the problem of retaining the loyalty of his own section while meeting the different needs and interests of other sections.

GROWING SECTIONALISM

The presidential election of 1824 thoroughly reflected the ferment. An array of candidates with different sectional bases endeavored to build national support. William H. Crawford, native Virginian and Georgian resident, commanded broad southern support and was allied with the dominant wing of the Republican party in New York, led by

Martin Van Buren and the Albany Regency. John Quincy Adams, Monroe's Secretary of State, had the backing of New Englanders and New Englanders transplanted to the newer settlements, with resultant solid chances for victory because the presidential field was so fragmented. John C. Calhoun, briefly a candidate, threw his support to Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, the war hero candidate of a shrewd group of local politicians, the Nashville Junto. A frontier conservative, whose views on issues were little known, Jackson was depicted as a backwoods democrat, a vision highly attractive to the unprosperous and discontented of his region. Henry Clay, advocate of internal improvements and the protective tariffs, had strength in the Ohio Valley but made no substantial progress in other sections.

Still other candidates of lesser political strength further jumbled the picture. With the likelihood that such a crowded field would throw the election into the House of Representatives, the vice-presidency became a much-used bait to eliminate opponents. Eventually, the election went to the House, where Adams ultimately prevailed.

For Andrew Jackson, 1824 was a prelude to victory in 1828. The imposing popular vote of his first candidacy, the political weakness that afflicted the Adams presidency, and the spreading base of Jackson's support propelled Jackson onward. The hard core of original Jackson men comprised grain farmers on nearly self-sufficient small holdings, cotton planters of lesser plantations, tobacco growers of the upper South and the declining tidewater plantations, the old democracy of rural and urban New York and Pennsylvania, most of the Piedmont, and professional politicians, chiefly Crawford men, who crossed with their leader into the Jackson camp.

Southern cotton planters and northwestern grain-growers expected him to clear the Indians out of their path, inland farmers awaited better transportation at federal expense, homesteaders, more land even through war with Mexico and England, if necessary, and Pennsylvania manufacturers, a steadily rising tariff. Jackson maintained discreet

silence on major issues, and his managers voted the interests of their states and districts on the questions of tariffs and internal improvements.

JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY

The 1828 presidential campaign was dominated by personal abuse hurled unstintingly between the Jackson and Adams camps. The election in reality was a contest between the old order and the new order of the common man, between popular rule and property rule. Joining the victorious Jackson in his new administration were John Calhoun, as Vice-President, and Martin Van Buren of New York, as Secretary of State.

In the ensuing administration, Jacksonian democracy established itself as the antimonopoly party, the foe of special privilege. The Jacksonians' favorite object of attack was the banking system, and the President unified his democratic following most securely when he dealt the death blow to the Bank of the United States. The presidential veto, through which this event transpired, was a skillful, unparalleled appeal to mass opinion in behalf of an official act. The veto portrayed the bank as monopolistic, unconstitutional and harmful to the country.

Jackson's policies also struck other blows at his rivals, past and future, for the presidency. Through his Maysville veto, he set federal internal improvements on a restricted basis, a move opposed to the known views of Henry Clay. And in the nullification crisis, he bested John Calhoun, who had broken with the Administration.

In addition to its mass appeal, the Jackson administration was effecting basic changes in party organization, increasing popular control at the expense of the professional politician. The party convention became the key to mass popular control, wresting control from the congressional caucus, which had treated Jackson badly in 1824. A delegate system of county, congressional district, state and national conventions became the means of implementing popular sovereignty. The emergence of the Democratic national convention of 1832, under Jackson's personal

supervision, assured his own renomination and the naming of his protege, Martin Van Buren, for the vice-presidency. The Jacksonian reign was further perpetuated by Van Buren's presidential victory in 1836.

THE RISE OF THE WHIGS

In this era a new party, the Whigs, emerged, composed chiefly of groups and interests alienated by Jackson's policies. The Whig party was a mosaic of many pieces and clashing colors, embracing protectionists and antiprotectionists, pro- and anti-Bank men, states' rights zealots, nationalists, planters and manufacturers, business men and farmers. It was, above all, a rallying point for the propertied interests alarmed at the elements gathered under the Jacksonians' popular flag.

The Whigs first captured the presidency in 1840, defeating Van Buren. A victim of economic depression, Van Buren had a political talent that did not wear well in the climate of the presidency. In 1840, he ran without a vice-presidential nominee on his ticket, because hostility to Richard M. Johnson, the incumbent Vice-President, was so intense, that neither he nor any other candidate was named. The Whigs' presidential choice was William Henry Harrison, a little-known general, presumed war hero of Tippecanoe who was sold by song and slogan to the electorate. John Tyler of Virginia, a states' rights man, balanced the ticket.

Subsequent presidential elections seesawed between the Whigs and Democrats. In a campaign marked by slander and mud-slinging, James K. Polk prevailed over Henry Clay in 1844. In 1848, the Whigs roared back with another war hero, General Zachary Taylor, "Old Rough and Ready," a Louisiana slaveholder. Millard Fillmore of New York balanced the ticket. With the North-South schism widening, no platform was drafted. In 1852, the Democrats won with Franklin Pierce and in 1856 with James Buchanan.

RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

More important to the future than these

Democratic triumphs were several fundamental revisions in the party structure, reflecting the country's deepening divisions over slavery. The Whigs, with irreconcilable northern, southern and western elements, were falling asunder and into oblivion. A shower of new parties appeared on the political landscape, of which one, the Republicans, became durable and major.

The Republican party rose out of numerous local meetings of antislavery men, whose union was speeded by the Kansas-Nebraska bill and a conference at Ripon, Wisconsin, on February 28, 1854. A Michigan convention on July 6 of that year adopted the name "Republican" and in 1856 the first national convention of the party assembled in Philadelphia.

The party's platform endorsed the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, denied the legality of slavery in the territories, and upheld the right and duty of Congress to bar from the territories "those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery." The platform called for a Pacific railroad and for river and harbor improvements in bids for the votes of California and the old Northwest. It demanded the admission of Kansas as a free state, and opposed legislation impairing liberty of conscience and equality of the rights of citizens. The Republicans were aided by large influxes of Whigs with established local organizations,

(Continued on page 242)

Louis W. Koenig has seen considerable government service. Once employed by the Bureau of the Budget, he also served in the State Department during the Truman administration and was a member of the foreign affairs task force of the first Hoover Commission. Among his numerous books are: *The Truman Administration* (New York: New York University Press, 1956) and *The Invisible Presidency* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). His newest work, *The Chief Executive* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World) is scheduled for publication in October, 1964.

Analyzing the growth of the modern Republican party, this writer says "The years between 1854 and 1912 saw the Republican party surge to power on a mighty wave of protest, stay in power by deflecting or making minor accommodations to a second great wave, and fall from power because it lacked the moral and intellectual strength to ride the crest of a third."

The Growth of the Republican Party

By WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH

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EARLY IN THE SUMMER of 1904, shortly after the Democrats named an impeccably conservative New York judge, Alton B. Parker, to oppose President Theodore Roosevelt's drive for a term in his own right, the New York *Sun* reluctantly endorsed Roosevelt. "We prefer," the *Sun* explained, "the impulsive candidate of the party of conservatism to the conservative candidate of the party which the business interests regard as permanently and dangerously impulsive."

The *Sun*, which was then the unofficial spokesman for Wall Street, had characteristically overstated the case. The Republican congressional delegation in 1904 was staunchly conservative and some of its leaders were openly reactionary. But the executive departments under Roosevelt were moderately progressive and the party's leadership in the states ranged from the militant progressivism of La Follette's organization in Wisconsin to the ultra-conservatism of the Quay-Penrose machine in Pennsylvania.

The *Sun's* charge that the Democratic party was "dangerously impulsive" was also inaccurate, even by the *Sun's* imprecise standards. Although one great wing of the Democracy embraced the neo-populist supporters of William Jennings Bryan, a second

sheltered the old-line disciples of laissez-faire and states' rights who had forced Parker's nomination, and a third, the non-ideological Irish-American urban masses. Yet, as the convulsions induced by Roosevelt's effort to push a progressive program through Congress soon proved, the G. O. P. was the party to which most northern businessmen belonged, into which most corporation leaders poured campaign funds, and out of which came the kind of leadership that made businessmen feel reasonably secure.

The domination by conservative businessmen of the party that had been born in opposition to slavery was surely one of the most striking ironies of a half century and more of ironies. The years between 1854 and 1912 saw the Republican party surge to power on a mighty wave of protest, stay in power by deflecting or making minor accommodations to a second great wave, and fall from power because it lacked the moral and intellectual strength to ride the crest of a third. They saw the Democratic party split fatefully into northern and southern factions, display remarkable resilience through four years of war, and eventually reemerge as the only party with nation-wide appeal. They saw a spate of third parties rise angrily in protest against the Republicans' and Democrats' indifference to social and economic reform.¹ And above all, they saw the partial submission to social control of an industrial system which

¹ The most important of these were the Liberal Republican (1872), Greenback-Labor (1880), Populist (1892), Socialist-Labor (1892), and Progressive (1912).

for all its marvelous works was even more raw and exploitative, more callous and irresponsible, than the politicians it commissioned to represent it.

Of the complex factors behind these developments, three or four warrant extended notice: the relationship of slavery and industry to the growth of the Republican party; the impact of Reconstruction upon both the Democratic and Republican parties; and the composition and objectives of the most important reform groups.

It would be naive, of course, to view even the beginnings of the Republican party solely in an antislavery context.² Its organizers and early supporters included Whigs who wanted it to become the spokesman of northern capital; western Democrats who were more angered by slavery's threat to free land than to free institutions; north-easterners and midwesterners who vaguely resented the South's powerful voice in federal affairs; and Know-Nothings who despised the Democratic party because of its large Irish-Catholic constituency.

IDEALS AND CONSERVATISM

Nevertheless, the new party drew much of its original strength and a disproportionate part of its leadership from reformers from Massachusetts to Wisconsin. It may well be true, as John R. Commons (who was not ordinarily a cynical man) once wrote, that "Only because slavery could not live on 160-acre farms did the Republican party come into conflict with slavery." Yet the fact is that it *did* come into contact with slavery and that opposition to the spread of slavery *did* give it its moral *raison d'être*. Only if this ideal was a rationalization of the moment, only if it had had no later life of its own, could the platform that formally launched the Republican party at Jackson, Michigan on July 6, 1854, with the ringing

assertion that slavery was "a great moral, social and political evil . . . the most revolting and oppressive with which the earth was ever cursed, or man debased," be written off. And only if the persistent influence of the Puritan conscience is discounted can we dismiss the strong showing the Republicans made in the congressional elections of 1854 in New England and in the midwestern counties where New England stock predominated.

Admittedly, idealism was not enough. It took the promise of free homesteads, "Bleeding Kansas," and a signal failure of leadership by Democratic Presidents Pierce and Buchanan to secure the new party's foothold in the North. And it took the disruption of the Democratic party by southern extremists to assure Abraham Lincoln's election as a minority President. Even that was less than the full price of victory. Gone from the Republican platform of 1860 was the condemnation of slavery that had given the party its moral force in 1854; written into the platform on which Lincoln stood were calls for tariff protection, railroad subsidies, and other measures designed to appeal to hesitant northern businessmen.

Fifteen years of war and Reconstruction completed the consolidation process; but it also submerged the party's remaining idealism and economic radicalism. By 1877, when President Rutherford Hayes removed the last federal troops from the South as one of the informal conditions of his disputed victory over Samuel J. Tilden, much of the North was as tired of Reconstruction as the South. And more ironic still, a large segment of the Republican party was prepared to accept the southern interpretation of that tragic epoch.

PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION

As Columbia University's Eric McKittrick suggests in an important book, chronology constitutes a major key to understanding Reconstruction.³ When hostilities ended in the spring of 1865, southerners were psychologically prepared to adjust to the demands of their conquerors; had action followed immediately, southern institutions might have been remolded as Japanese institutions were

² The two best histories of the Republican party are Malcolm Moos, *The Republicans* (New York: Random House, 1956), and George H. Mayer, *The Republican Party* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

³ See Eric L. McKittrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

remolded under MacArthur after World War II. But President Andrew Johnson, a crude and ill-educated War Democrat from Tennessee who spared no love for the Negro, pursued substantially the same lenient policy toward the South that Lincoln had planned to pursue. In so doing, he gave southerners six brooding months to lick their wounds, reelect their old leaders to Congress, and issue "Black Codes" designed to deprive Negroes of the full rights of citizenship and even to reduce them to *de facto* servitude.

This threatened the Republicans with loss of the political and moral fruits of victory; and when the all-white southern delegation elected by the all-white southern electorate appeared in Washington in December, 1865, the Republican majority in Congress testily refused to seat it. The Republicans then passed bills to strengthen the Freedman's Bureau, a welfare agency for Negroes which soon became an adjunct of the G. O. P., and to guarantee Negroes civil rights. But not until *after* Johnson vetoed both measures and ten southern states voted *not* to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment did a majority of Republicans begin to support the hard policy that a vengeful—and in a sense, realistic—minority had all along deemed necessary.

The federal occupation that the unregenerate South thus forced upon itself was nowhere total—a corporal's guard of 711 troops garrisoned Mississippi in 1869—and the Republican rule that it temporarily sustained was nowhere truly oppressive.⁴ Negroes never dominated a single state government or used their new-gained influence vindictively. And though they did indulge in petty corruption and minor extravagances, the large-scale peculations of the era were committed by whites.⁵ As that calm and dispassionate ob-

server of the American scene, Lord Bryce, wrote a few years later, "there never was a Civil War or a rebellion followed by so few severities."

A far more objective measure of Reconstruction than corruption is the Reconstruction government's reforms. Not the least of these established a free public school system staffed partly by northern idealists of the same high purpose as those who risked their lives in the civil rights movement in Mississippi a century later. It is the great and continuing tragedy of American history, however, that the moment for recasting southern institutions and reforming southern attitudes had long since passed.

By the time "Radical" Reconstruction finally began in the spring of 1867, the South had already regained its confidence and hardened its prejudices. It had fixed on a course that made creation of the myth of "Black" Reconstruction inevitable. And it had fastened on the Democratic party as the medium for upholding a theory of states' rights fast being rendered obsolete by the rise of a national industrial and communications system.

Ulysses S. Grant's victory over Horatio Seymour of New York in 1868 by a slim popular majority augured little better for the Negro. Grant did enforce civil rights; but his personal slogan, "Let Us Have Peace," symbolized his lack of interest in uplifting the Negro. And in what may fairly be called the real "Crime of Reconstruction," neither his administration nor the resurgent northern Democrats considered proposals to grant the ex-slaves land and other subsidies that would have enabled them to form a middle class and begin to overcome the debilitating feelings of inferiority ingrained in them by two centuries of physical and mental bondage.

While Reconstruction was making the emergence of the solid Democratic South a virtual certainty, it was also giving the Republicans a tradition of congressional supremacy broken only once in 90 years (by Theodore Roosevelt), and then only partly. Even worse, perhaps, it was draining the G. O. P.'s already depleted moral resources

⁴ The most up-to-date history of Reconstruction is John Hope Franklin, *Reconstruction After the Civil War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

⁵ Actually, corruption in the North—in the cities, in the states, in the federal government, and in business—was at least as serious a problem as in the Reconstruction governments. The white, southern Democratic governments which came in after Reconstruction were also frequently corrupt.

by sparking a revolt of some of its most high-minded leaders.

LIBERAL REPUBLICANS

Appalled by the crassness of the Grant regime and resigned to the southern view that home rule would be best for white and black alike, Carl Schurz, Charles Francis Adams, and numerous lesser men organized the Liberal Republican party in 1872. They ran Horace Greely, the erratic editor and reformer, against Grant; but in spite of the Democrats' unhappy endorsement of Greely, the President won reelection by a resounding majority. Twelve years later many of these same reformers supported Grover Cleveland in his successful campaign against James G. Blaine, the corruption-tinted Republican nominee in 1884. Undoubtedly, these actions encouraged the Republicans and Democrats to support minor reforms, particularly in the civil service; but they also cost the reformers all chance of shaping the Republican party's destiny.

Probably it made no difference, for the corrupting influences swept in by the tidal wave of industrialism were almost irreversible. At the most, the "Mugwumps" might have made Republican rule a little more honest, a little more conservative in dispensing favors to veterans and businessmen. Manufacturing might not have been quite so overprotected, the railroads so oversubsidized, and the nation's natural resources so badly exploited.

But it is idle to think that the main thrust of American politics would have been altered. The transcontinental railway system could not have been built without government subvention, and the country could not have flourished without cutting its forests and extracting its minerals. The Mugwumps understood this; and though they spoke out against the tariff, they otherwise failed to challenge the G. O. P.'s subservience to business or to protest the cruel repression of labor by the private and public agencies of capital. Accordingly, Republican national policy tended to liberate, rather than fetter, the puissant forces of industrialism. And even when such an aberration as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act occurred,

party leaders quickly nullified its effect by failing to enforce it.

The states' rights and agrarian heritage of the Democratic party made it less disposed than the G. O. P. to grant privileges to business; but until the rise of William Jennings Bryan any real difference was negligible. Many of the party's leaders, particularly from the new South, were pro-industry. The eastern wing drew too heavily on the urban, immigrant political machines to attract young middle class reformers. And Cleveland's attachment to laissez-faire and state's rights discouraged enactment or enforcement of the regulatory devices essential to a more just and orderly national development.

THIRD PARTIES

The failure of both the Republicans and Democrats to respond to the felt needs of labor and agriculture fostered the rise of the third parties mentioned earlier. All except the Progressives advanced a simplistic analysis of society, and all (except the Socialists) failed to survive. But their significance was considerable, if only because they gave their partisans a critical emotional outlet and influenced the major parties to adopt important parts of their programs. To be sure, the latter process was slow, irregular, and inconclusive. Agriculture waited until the Wilson administration to win the substance of its demands, labor until the New Deal. But without the continuous prospect of relief the third parties afforded, the nation might have been torn by revolution or reduced to feudalism.

In agriculture, unrest stemmed from a falling price level and a rising debt structure caused by overexpansion. Instead of attacking overproduction, however, farmers directed their fire to symptoms and peripheral causes. Organizing into Granges in the 1860's and 1870's, they forced state regulation of railroad and grain elevator rates. They then took control of Peter Cooper's Greenback-Labor party, which had been organized to raise the wages of urban workers, in the hope that currency inflation would drive up prices.

Finally they joined in a militant new movement, the Farmers' Alliance, and outlined a comprehensive reform program at Ocala, Florida, in 1890. Although again they failed to face the problem of overproduction, their demands for a graduated income tax, direct election of United States senators, and federal control of communications and transportation facilities foreshadowed the reforms of the Progressive Era.

Scorned as radicals by both the Republican and Democratic parties, they formally organized the national People's (Populist) party at Omaha in 1892 and ran James Baird Weaver against Benjamin Harrison, the Republican candidate, and Democrat Grover Cleveland, who was elected. Weaver polled 1,040,000 popular votes and 22 electoral votes, but failed to win much support from labor, the most radical elements of which voted Socialist-Labor.⁶

FAILURE OF THE POPULISTS

Meanwhile the Democratic party was taking on the characteristics which prompted the New York *Sun*, in 1904, to call it "impulsive." Cleveland's inadequacies were brought into sharp relief by the Panic of 1893. He had said, in his second inaugural, that "while the people should patriotically and cheerfully support their Government, its functions do not include the support of the people." And when he refused to approve modest increases in the currency supply, he eased the way for Bryan's nomination in 1896 on a platform calling for the free and unlimited coinage of silver. The Populists thereupon endorsed Bryan in the expectation that he would campaign on their more comprehensive platform,

though they also supported free silver. But the "Great Commoner" chose instead to focus on the currency question. He did come out strongly enough on the tariff, however, to suffer from a backlash by frightened workers who were warned that his election would result in the loss of their jobs.⁷

The Populists' loss of identity and Bryan's defeat in 1896 and again in 1900 and 1908 have obscured the long-term significance of the agrarians' revolt. Notwithstanding their grave deficiencies—their tendency to accept a conspiracy theory of history, their failure to grapple with overproduction, and their exaggerations of the iniquities of the railroads, money-lenders and middlemen—their total impact was more constructive than destructive. They gave the Democratic party, and to some extent the Republican party, a more progressive base. They aired many far-reaching reforms for the first time. And in the very act of repelling thousands of thoughtful urban residents, they made them reflect on at least some of the injustices in American society. William Allen White, the Kansas editor, again proved himself an astute observer when he wrote of the Progressive movement a few years later: "Populism shaved its whiskers, washed its shirt, put on a derby and moved up into the middle of the class—the upper middle class."

McKinley's victory in 1896 and Bryan's abortive effort to make imperialism the central issue in the campaign of 1900 have similarly drawn a veil over the modest revolution within the Republican party. Even while Republican voters were affirming with a vengeance their national leaders' marriage to the lords of the market place, they were supporting hundreds of candidates for municipal and state offices on advanced reform programs. Influenced partly by the Darwinian belief that man could shape his environment creatively but largely by more practical considerations, the same kind of civic-minded Republicans who had created the public school system in the North had begun by the 1890's to fight for more progressive state and local government.

Their power was now greatly increased,

⁶ The harsh and unappreciative treatment of populism by Richard Hofstadter in *The Age of Reform* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), has been sharply and effectively attacked by Walter T. Nugent, *The Tolerant Populists* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) and Norman Pollack, *The Populist Response to Industrial America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

⁷ Paul W. Glad, *The Trumpet Soundeth* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), gives a sympathetic treatment of William Jennings Bryan. A critical analysis of both Bryan's and Cleveland's political leadership may be found in J. Rogers Hollingsworth, *The Whirligig of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

however, by the new white collar class. Predominantly old stock, Protestant, and urban, this group had grown from less than a million, when the reformers were flailing Grant in 1872, to more than six million in 1900. Its members were unencumbered by the tribal loyalties that made the city and state machines corrupt and irresponsible agencies of government, and their puritanical heritage made them respond indignantly to the sordid revelations of the muckrakers. Throughout Theodore Roosevelt's seven and one-half years of sparring with the spokesmen of business and finance who controlled the Republicans in Congress, they and their upper middle class leaders gave the President invaluable moral support.⁸

REPUBLICAN CLEAVAGE

Yet neither the political genius of Roosevelt, who "reigned" from 1901 to 1909, nor the growing restiveness of the new middle class wrought any important change in the Old Guard's orientation in Congress. Roosevelt's later statement that "Our own party leaders did not realize that I was able to hold the Republican party in power only because I insisted on a steady advance, and dragged them along with me" was true enough. But the larger truth is that both big and small businessmen held such a tight grip on Congress that almost all of Roosevelt's momentous actions were executive in character.

Only when different business groups came into conflict and one or the other sided with

the President, as on the Hepburn railroad rate bill, did Congress enact major legislation. And only on the pure food and drug bill and the meat inspection measure was it moved basically by public opinion.⁹

Thus Roosevelt's bold plan to put all big business under federal supervision was thwarted by the Senate oligarchs. His attempt to strengthen the labor movement by stopping the abuse of the injunction was beaten back by the National Association of Manufacturers. And his repeated calls for multipurpose river valley development were muffled by the utilities interests. The New York *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* echoed a common congressional complaint when it said near the end of Roosevelt's tenure that if a fraction of his recommendations were written into law, "they would make over the face of social creation." And the New York *Sun* spoke for conservatives the nation over when it proclaimed that "the seven-year flood of words" would at last dry up!

This rejection of the movement for social justice which had given the G. O. P. moral fervor for the first time since the Civil War and had made Roosevelt one of the two distinguished presidents the party ever produced deepened the Republican schism. It failed, however, to reduce the Old Guard's majority substantially, the voters avenging themselves by electing Democrats rather than progressive Republicans. Never in the Progressive Era did more than a quarter of the Republican congressional delegation raise the Progressive standard; never during this period, not even at the height of insurgency in 1910, did a majority of Republicans in Congress

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⁸ George E. Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Harper, 1958), has a highly perceptive chapter on the Progressives' values and backgrounds.

⁹ I do not mean to disparage Roosevelt's extraordinary powers of leadership as set forth in John M. Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), or in my own work. The point is, however, that Roosevelt was able to move Congress on the railway rate bill because the shippers (manufacturers) were also demanding action. He never tried seriously to reform the tariff because he knew the manufacturing interests would protest so vigorously that it would be impossible to get a reasonable bill through Congress. Taft tried in 1909, and, predictably, failed to get a good bill. Wilson's success with the Underwood bill in 1913 was attributable to the higher incidence of agrarianism within the Democratic party. See, in particular, Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive* (New York: Harper, 1954).

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Speculating as to the effect of the presidential election of 1916, this author says "Wilson's triumph in 1916 may have had far-reaching consequences for political alignment in this country. The nation's endorsement of his brand of progressivism—embodying as it did much of Theodore Roosevelt's 'New Nationalism'—may have strengthened the progressive elements in the Democratic party for the next generation."

The Election of 1916

By JAMES A. HUSTON
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AS NEWS DISPATCHES from Europe brought reports of a war raging there of a magnitude beyond all comprehension, and as the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915 seemed to bring that war closer to the American doorstep, a "great debate" on foreign policy and military preparedness began to develop in the United States. As far as the approaching election of 1916 was concerned, the big questions were what effect the concern about the war might have on political attitudes and behavior, whether the domestic achievements of the "New Freedom" would be overshadowed in the minds of the voters, and whether the Progressives who had bolted the party in 1912 would return to the Republican fold.

On the last point, it was clear that many Progressives had supported Republican congressional candidates in 1914, but what the situation would be in 1916 was not at all clear. It remained to be seen whether the Progressive party which, by the size of its vote in 1912, actually had succeeded to the place of the second major party, was a party of principles and cohesiveness, or simply the instrument of its dominant personality. Its leaders, sure that Theodore Roosevelt had lost none of his appeal with the voters, and seeing his vigorous nationalism as an added appeal in the face of a dangerous European war, were urging the Rough Rider to make another try.

Roosevelt had not lost his interest in another term as President, but he was not so much concerned about making the Progressive party a permanent organization. He did not want to head a Progressive ticket again unless he could have the Republican nomination also.

In the hope of agreeing upon a fusion candidate, leaders arranged for the national conventions of the two parties to meet simultaneously in Chicago. Peace emissaries between the two conventions tried to find a basis for joining forces, but it quickly became clear that the Progressives were willing to compromise on any candidate only as long as it was Theodore Roosevelt.

In the meantime, however, a strong groundswell had developed within the ranks of the regular Republicans for Charles Evans Hughes, former governor of New York, and then an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court. Hughes had been a long-time friend of William Howard Taft, and he had made an impressive record as a liberal governor. His public record, the almost universal respect which he enjoyed, and his lack of enemies or identification with the Republican split encouraged many Republicans to hope that the Party would reunite behind him to bring victory in November. By the time of the conventions he was the clear favorite of the rank-and-file republicans.

Hughes had been mentioned as a compromise candidate in 1912; indeed Taft himself had indicated that he would be willing to step aside in favor of Hughes, but the Justice would hear none of it. Now Taft had urged him to reconsider. Hughes still refused to be a candidate and asked his friends not to embarrass his position on the Supreme Court by political activity in his behalf. Nevertheless the Michigan state convention endorsed him; he won the primaries in Vermont and Oregon; and leaders from various other states began coming out for him.

HUGHES' NOMINATION

Frank H. Hitchcock, who had been Taft's campaign manager in 1908, set about, with the backing and financial support of Eugene Meyer, to line up delegates. Hughes repudiated his work, and denied any communication with him, but Hitchcock went ahead anyway. By the time the Republican convention assembled it was obvious that Hughes was the favorite, and T.R. had no chance.

Hughes won the nomination on the third ballot even though the delegates still had no assurance that he would accept. As the balloting for Hughes went on, the Progressives in their convention nominated Roosevelt by acclamation. His "conditional refusal" to accept brought bitter cries of "running out" and "apostate"; he had "pulled the rug" from under them.

Roosevelt now hoped to lead the Progressives back to the Republican camp to present a united front against the reelection of Woodrow Wilson, but he was not altogether successful. A splinter group organized a "shadow" Progressive convention at Indianapolis in early August, and gave its nomination to Wilson. Sixteen of the nineteen members of the 1912 Progressive party's Resolutions Committee endorsed Wilson's legislative achievements, and eleven of the group signed a statement urging the President's reelection. Among the signers were John Parker of Louisiana, whom the Progressives had already nominated for the vice-presidency; Joseph M. Carey of Wyoming, one of the seven governors who had petitioned

T.R. in 1912, and Hugh Halbert, candidate for governor of Minnesota. La Follette tacitly supported Hughes.

On the Democratic side, the tremendous program of progressive or reform legislation that Wilson had pushed through Congress, and the general popularity he had achieved made his renomination at the St. Louis convention a foregone conclusion. He wrote the original draft of the party platform himself.

As the Democratic convention opened, ex-Governor Martin H. Glynn of New York rose to dramatic heights in his keynote address. Citing example after example in American history of the peaceful settlement of disputes, he would pause after each to say, "But we didn't go to war." Soon he found himself in an antiphony as the crowd would shout "What did we do?" And he would cry, "We didn't go to war!" The next day Senator Ollie James of Kentucky, once more permanent chairman of the convention, found the same kind of enthusiastic response as he hit the pacifist theme in his address. Here was born the Democrats' campaign slogan: "He kept us out of war."

ANTIWAR SLOGANS

The very fact that antiwar slogans could have such an appeal in 1916 was indicative of a consciousness of the changing position of the United States in world affairs—an awareness of the very likelihood of being drawn into a general European war. Not since the War of 1812 had the United States been involved in a European conflict, and in the tradition of Washington's Farewell Address, Jefferson's First Inaugural and the Monroe Doctrine, an assumption had grown up that the United States could insulate itself from European quarrels. During a century in which there were no general wars, it was easy for an isolationist assumption to gain substance. Now, as Americans regarded with increasing apprehension the first general European war in a hundred years, they began to develop a feeling that sooner or later they would be involved. They were anxious for reassurance that this was not so.

Wilson was uneasy about being tied to the slogan, "He kept us out of war." He could not very well repudiate it, for it was a simple fact, and his greatest hope was that it would continue to be so; yet the slogan gained its force as an implied promise to stay out of the war. Such an inference could weaken Wilson's hand diplomatically, and it would lead to costly neglect of defense preparations.

Neither Wilson nor the electorate had reached the state of political sophistication where uneasy feelings about involvement and danger could be spelled out clearly in terms of the national security of the United States. The best that Wilson could say was that he did not expect war, and that the election of Hughes probably would bring war.

On the other hand, it is hardly likely that American entry into the war during the political campaign would have brought about the defeat of Wilson. As Vance McCormick, his campaign manager, put it when Secretary of State Robert Lansing expressed concern about using the slogan in the face of the real possibility of getting into the war,

That does not disturb me in the least; if Wilson has to declare war between now and November he will certainly be elected. Nothing can more easily assure him of victory.

MILITARY POLICY CONFLICT

But Wilson faced a real dilemma in the summer of 1916, as he attempted to satisfy the peace sentiment among the voters and in his own heart, and at the same time to meet diplomatic crises firmly and to take steps for military preparedness. Actually, serious division had threatened both parties during the months preceding the conventions.

Almost with the outbreak of the European war in 1914, controversy over military policy had erupted. Theodore Roosevelt immediately began a campaign to alert the country to its military weakness, and he had the vocal support of organizations such as the Army League, the Navy League, and the newly formed National Security League. A small group of advocates took up the cry, but nothing had much effect either on the public or on the President until the sinking of the Lusitania (May 8, 1915).

Then, amidst the torrent of preparedness literature and diplomatic notes, the mood of the country seemed to change. Wilson himself became a convert to preparedness, but his proposals for reorganization and expansion of the Army and for naval construction raised storms of protest in Congress.

A core of some 30 to 50 southern and western Democrats formed an antipreparedness bloc against Wilson's proposals. They gained much support from congressmen throughout the country who were opposing especially a move to abolish the National Guard. Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison, accepting suggestions of Army leaders and the Army War College for an improved reserve force which would be immediately responsive to federal control, but ignoring the political sensibilities of political leaders long devoted to state control of National Guard forces, had come up with a scheme for a "Continental Army." Wilson urged adoption of the plan, but a phalanx of opposition formed in the House, and the Committee on Military Affairs came out instead with a plan for "federalizing" the National Guard in times of emergency. Wilson took a "swing around the circle" to carry the preparedness campaign to the people, but he returned to Washington early in February, 1916, to find the opposition in his own party undented. He gave in, in order to get any bill at all, and accepted the resignation of Secretary Garrison.

The preparedness battle took on especially significant political overtones not only in threatening to split the Democratic party, but also in the prospect of alienating many independent and Republican progressives who might otherwise be drawn to support Wilson for reelection on the basis of his impressive record of progressive legislation. This issue threatened a further split in the Republican party just when leaders were hopeful of bringing back Roosevelt's Progressives. Eastern Republicans, following leaders like Roosevelt, Elihu Root, and Henry Cabot Lodge, were demanding a large-scale defense program and protection of American rights on the high seas, and honor against Mexico.

Middle West Republicans, on the other hand, stood fast against practically all preparedness—and were willing to abandon rights on the seas if necessary to prevent war. This was a sentiment voiced on the Democratic side by the Gore-McLemore Resolutions, which Wilson had been able to defeat only by strict appeals to party loyalty.

After the House had passed a watered-down Army bill in March, 1916, the *Sussex* crisis stimulated renewed efforts for expanded defense measures. The Senate returned to the Garrison proposals, including the "Continental Army" idea for its version of the bill. By the time a House-Senate conference was able to act upon the bills, however, the *Sussex* crisis had passed (May), and in many respects the House version prevailed in the National Defense Act of 1916, which the President signed just two days before the opening of the Republican National Convention.

Meanwhile the Navy bill was faring rather better. The House ignored an Administration request for a five-year naval construction program, but it did approve (June 2) a larger construction program than had been asked for the first year. With Progressive opposition largely spent against the Army bill, the Senate went much further. It approved a bill to complete the proposed five-year program in three years. This time the Senate version prevailed, and the President was able to sign the bill on August 15. A few weeks later he signed the Merchant Marine Act of 1916 which provided for establishment of the United States Shipping Board. The whole preparedness program was made a little more palatable for progressives by the Revenue Act of 1916, which shifted much of the burden for financing federal programs to the higher income brackets.

MORE FEDERAL PARTICIPATION

If progressives had qualms about Wilson's defense policy, they hardly could expect to find better assurance in the Republican party, where Roosevelt was openly preaching war-like policies, and accusing Wilson of cowardice. On the other hand, those truly attracted by progressive principles rather than by the

play of personalities could not fail to be impressed by Wilson's legislative achievements. Ironically, Wilson and his followers had in effect given up the philosophy of the "New Freedom," and had embraced much of Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" which called for more direct participation of the federal government in social and economic reform.

Such measures passed in 1916, at the insistence of Wilson, as the Federal Farm Loan Act, the Child Labor Act, and the Adamson Act providing for an eight-hour day on interstate railroads (urged as much as a measure to avert a strike which might cripple the munitions industries as a reform measure *per se*) were open invitations for progressive support. Actually, Theodore Roosevelt was turning his wrath on the candidate most likely to give effect to the platform on which he had run in 1912.

For his part Hughes, too, was known as a progressive, but he was not an effective campaigner. He was hesitant to attack Wilson's policies of neutrality or national defense or his domestic program of progressive reform. The Republican candidate therefore concentrated his attacks on Wilson's Mexican policy, and insisted that his administration would perform more efficiently. Many Old Guard Republicans referred to Hughes as "a pale edition of Wilson," or "a whiskered Wilson." The Democrats referred to him as "Charles E-vasion Hughes." Many Progressives, on the other hand, were convinced that he was a captive of the Old Guard political bosses. The prominence of conservatives in Hughes' councils, and disappointment with Roosevelt, led the Progressives in sizeable numbers to the Democratic ranks.

While people stood aghast and in alarm at the European war, Hughes and the Republicans were content to talk about waste, extravagance, inefficiency, a scientific tariff, and the spoils system. Democrats were running advertisements which said: "Wilson—Peace, Prosperity, and Progress. Hughes—War, Misery, Depression."

The Democrats still insisted on campaigning against Roosevelt. One cartoon depicted T.R. as Secretary of War saying, "Peace is

hell." Senator Atlee Pomerene, campaigning for reelection in Ohio, said, "There is one man in this country who wants to go to war and his name is Teddy, the Terrible. General Sherman said, 'war is hell'. If Teddy wants to go, let him go. No one is holding him."

Senator Warren G. Harding insisted that it was absurd to say that Hughes would bring war. He said that Wilson, instead of keeping out of war, had got into war already in Mexico. The Democrats quoted with relish a statement attributed to Albert Fall (later Secretary of the Interior under Harding): "A Hughes war would be preferable to a Wilson peace."

It might have been wise for Hughes to stay out of California until after the primaries—or indeed to have stayed out altogether. Here where bitter Progressive-regular battles were being waged, he was bound to lose with one or the other. Much has been made of his "snub" of Hiram Johnson at Long Beach, but this probably exaggerates the importance of this incident in determining the outcome in California, and it overstates the importance of California in the election.

Wilson did not take the field until late September. Remaining close to his desk to preside over enactment of the preparedness program and the Adamson Act, he then opened a campaign of devastating effectiveness. When Hughes attacked the eight-hour law as a surrender to the railroad workers, Wilson replied that this ought to be the goal for all workers. Hughes' questions about a Democratic program were answered by reference to the most impressive program of reform legislation in the country's history.

The hopes for peace, progressive reform, and continued prosperity were too much for Hughes to overcome. But it was a breathtaking race. On the morning after the election newspaper headlines announced that Hughes had been elected, though both parties still were claiming victory. It was another two days before the outcome was certain.

WILSON VICTORY

As it turned out, Wilson could not have won without California, though it must be

remembered that any other 13 electoral votes were just as important. There, while Hughes was losing to Wilson by 4,000 votes, Hiram Johnson, running on the same ticket, was defeating George S. Patton for the Senate by nearly 300,000 votes.

The *Los Angeles Times*, calling Johnson "Judas Iscariot" and "Benedict Arnold," commented bitterly:

Stabbed in the house of its alleged friends, the Republican party lies bleeding. Lured by fair promises the Republicans of California were led to place their trust in a crooked political machine that sought control only for the purpose of delivering the party bound and gagged into the hands of its political enemies.

It pointed out that Sacramento County, the home of Johnson, gave the Governor a majority of 6,000, while it also gave Wilson a majority of 4,000—his total margin in California.

Johnson retorted:

A few party politicians, acting with the *Los Angeles Times* and one or two others, so misused Mr. Hughes and his visit to California that the injury they did we were unable to undo.

Still California's moderate size in 1916 sometimes is overshadowed in our thinking by its growth since that date. Then, instead of being the rival of New York as the nation's most populous state, it had no more electoral vote power than did Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Iowa, or many other states which it now far surpasses. Probably most significant in the Wilson victory was the vote of Ohio. It and New Hampshire were the only states east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio and the Mason-Dixon line to go Democratic.

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Weighing the comparative positions of the Democrats and the Republicans as the 1920's began, this historian writes "... the Democrats carried a heavy load in the election of 1920. The conservatives and the business interests had always been opposed to Wilson. By 1920, most of the Bull-Moose Progressives of 1912 were back in the Grand Old Party, and it soon became clear that the Republicans would resume their old place as the nation's majority party."

The Politics of the 1920's

By WILLIAM G. CARLETON

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THE PERIOD of the 1920's, in contrast to the Progressive era which preceded it and the New Deal which followed it, was one of general conservatism.

Despite the fact that the United States had emerged from World War I the most powerful country on earth and the leading creditor nation, Americans recoiled from world affairs and became markedly nationalistic. They turned their backs on the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, raised their protective tariffs, and required repayment from their wartime Allies of all intergovernmental loans, even when this exactment threatened world trade and stability.

After a temporary business recession in 1920-1922, produced by the shock of converting from a war economy to a peace economy, the 1920's were years of phenomenal prosperity. Stockholders in the large corporations plowed back their war profits into industrial expansion. Technological improvements, mass production, mass advertising, and mass installment buying resulted in a mass consumer society without precedent. The automotive, electrical equipment, and radio industries led the way. Mechanical conveniences multiplied enormously. Low-income families in large numbers abandoned the well and the cistern for inside plumbing, the outhouse for the bathroom, kerosene lamps and gas lights for electricity. Low-

priced automobiles became common, and even families of modest means gathered around their radio sets, fascinated by national broadcasting.

Big corporations were consolidated into bigger ones, and holding companies proliferated. Some of the earnings of the large corporations found their way into stock market speculation, and in the closing years of the decade a bull market of unprecedented volume and length inflated values, beckoned to quick riches, and persuaded even sober men of affairs that the end of poverty and the age of permanent plenty were at hand.

There was a new hostility to organized labor. It was felt that labor unions had grown too large and powerful during the war. Numerous postwar labor strikes to compel higher wages to meet the higher costs of living were regarded as impediments to readjusting to a peacetime economy. Hence, there were drives to weaken labor unions, and in general unions declined in membership and effectiveness during the 1920's.

There was a new passion for conformity, for "100 per cent Americanism." In part this was a leftover of the surcharged patriotism engendered by the war, in part a popular reaction to upthrusting revolutionary movements. The violence of the Industrial Workers of the World, during and immediately

following the war, frightened many Americans. The fears were compounded by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the founding shortly thereafter of an American Communist party, affiliated with the Moscow-dominated Third International.

Superpatriotic organizations, to keep watch on intellectuals, subversives, labor "agitators," and hyphenated Americans, mushroomed. There were drives to curb "the Reds." Many aliens were deported. Loyalty oaths were required of school teachers. Duly elected Socialist members of the New York legislature were expelled. Socialist Victor Berger was denied his legally won seat in Congress. Liberals charged that Sacco and Vanzetti, active in radical movements, were "railroaded" to the electric chair. Negroes in large numbers had migrated North to work in wartime industries and this resulted, during the early postwar years, in angry racial tensions and some serious race riots. Anti-Semitism came to the surface, with Henry Ford financing an influential anti-Jewish periodical.¹ The Ku Klux Klan, exploiting prejudices against Negroes, Jews, and Catholics, developed into a powerful mass movement not only in the South but in some of the northern states.

By way of contrast, the 1920's also experienced a spectacular revolt from the old puritan mores, perhaps best exemplified in the writings of F. Scott Fitzgerald and H. L. Mencken. But only one aspect of this revolution in morals and manners had any direct bearing on the politics of the period—the growing opposition to prohibition, which had become the law of the land only as recently as 1919.

There were, however, liberal forces at work which had considerable impact on the politics of the 1920's and much more impact on the politics of the 1930's. The general prosperity of the country was not shared by the farmers, who had greatly expanded production during the war and found no adequate markets for their surpluses when war demands were cut off and Europe again enjoyed full

production. Consequently the farmers, especially in the corn and wheat states, organized political protest movements reminiscent of Populist days. In various ways the Non-Partisan League, the Farmer-Labor party, the La Follette progressives, the Farmers' Union, and even the more conservative American Farm Bureau Federation supported governmental programs for the farmer.

In the eastern cities, "the new Americans" were finding in Alfred E. Smith and his brown derby fresh symbols of their economic and status drives—and their disdain of prohibition. In the intellectual world, too, liberal ideas were gestating. Charles A. Beard and other historians were interpreting history in economic terms; Thorstein Veblen was questioning the values of business and of a business-oriented society; John Dewey was refining his instrumentalism; Roscoe Pound, Benjamin Cardozo, and Justices Holmes and Brandeis were exploring a new social realism in jurisprudence.

BACK TO NORMALCY

The accumulated discontents of the war and of the postwar let-down were all lumped together and attributed to "Wilsonism." Hence, the Democrats carried a heavy load in the election of 1920. The conservatives and the business interests had always been opposed to Wilson. By 1920, most of the Bull-Moose Progressives of 1912 were back in the Grand Old Party, and it soon became clear that the Republicans would resume their old place as the nation's majority party. The war had been America's first total one; many resented the military draft; many more resented the unprecedented civilian regimentation which the war had necessarily imposed. Even the liberals were angry with Wilson over the curbing of civil rights during the war and Attorney-General Mitchell Palmer's "witch-hunt" of Reds and aliens after the war. In 1920, the wartime inflation of consumer prices continued, but in the spring of that year the prices paid farmers by middle men fell disastrously, and hence both city folks and country folks were disgruntled.

¹ *The Dearborn Independent*.

There was bitterness over the failure of Wilson's peace aims. Democracy? But Russia had gone Bolshevik. Peace? But the world seemed to be in a more troubled state than before the war. America's Allies were distributing among themselves the old Turkish empire and Germany's colonies. They were saddling Germany with unrealistic reparations. The new countries created in Eastern and Central Europe were rounding out their boundaries, claiming and grabbing "irredentas" from one another. Even the settlement with Germany pleased few. Some thought that Germany had been treated too harshly, others that she had not been sufficiently curbed for the future. Many Americans argued in this fashion:

True, if one nation should again threaten to gobble the rest of Europe, this might pose a dangerous threat to the United States. But such threats seem to arise only once in a century, and if another one arises, then we will meet it at that time. Meanwhile, let us return to our own hemisphere and not commit ourselves under the League of Nations to police Europe and the world forever.

Some of America's most powerful minority blocs were in a particularly wrathful mood—German-Americans because of the aspersions cast upon them during the war and because of the "harsh" German peace; Irish-Americans because of Wilson's "pro-British attitude" and his failure to win Irish independence; Italian-Americans because of Wilson's stand against certain of Italy's territorial ambitions.

The truth is that America's first full-scale participation in international affairs had been too abrupt a break with America's traditional past. Americans had not yet accustomed themselves to the hard realities of world politics.

The campaign of 1920 really began with the debates in the United States Senate over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, which included the League of Nations. In late 1919 and again in early 1920, the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty, to which the Lodge Reservations, safeguarding in certain particulars America's "sovereignty" and constitutional procedures, had been attached. The Wilsonites, who disliked the Reserva-

tions, and the Isolationists, who wanted no part of the Treaty, with or without the Reservations, joined forces to defeat it.

The three leading presidential candidates before the Republican convention were General Leonard Wood, Senator Hiram Johnson, and Governor Frank O. Lowden of Illinois. The Old Guard of the Republican party felt that Wood had been too close to Theodore Roosevelt, who had split the party in 1912; that he was too military-minded; and that he could not be "managed." Johnson was even less acceptable, for he had been Roosevelt's Bull-Moose running mate in 1912, and his isolationism was too extreme even for 1920. Lowden, the most acceptable of the three, was fatally embarrassed when some of his managers, unknown to him, sought to bribe several Missouri delegates.

The convention deadlocked and a conference of big-wigs determined that Senator Warren G. Harding would make the best compromise candidate. Harding came from the pivotal state of Ohio; he had always been "regular"; he was amiable and could be "handled"; his McKinley conservatism and "back-to-normalcy" outlook reflected the mood of the country; and he "looked like a President." Accordingly, the word went out that it was to be Harding, and he was duly nominated. But for second place the convention rejected the choice of the insiders, and spontaneously turned to Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts, who had captured the conservative imagination during the Boston police strike of September, 1919, with his terse declaration: "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time."

The Democrats, too, had three front-runners. They were Governor James M. Cox of Ohio, Attorney-General Palmer, and William G. McAdoo, who had recently resigned as Secretary of the Treasury and was President Wilson's son-in-law. In this case, although the convention was deadlocked until the forty-fourth ballot, it did not turn to a compromise favorite son but finally chose Cox, who had steadily made gains as the balloting continued. McAdoo was considered

to be too close to Wilson, and Palmer was unpopular with the liberals because of his Red-hunting. Cox was an able and popular three-time Governor of the "swing" state of Ohio; he was not connected with the Wilson administration; he was liked by the bosses; and it was hoped that his "wet" record would draw heavily in the urban areas. The convention then followed Cox's advice and chose as his running mate the young Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, who had a vote-getting name.

Cox and Roosevelt defended the League of Nations and made it the chief issue of the campaign. The Republicans shrewdly worked both sides of the street on the League issue. Isolationists like Senators Johnson, William Borah and George Norris assured voters that a vote for Harding was a vote against the League, while former President William Howard Taft, Charles Evans Hughes, and Elihu Root told them that since the Senate was sure to be Republican the League would have a better chance of being ratified with a Republican President than a Democratic one. Harding himself worked the middle of the street. He seemed to prefer a loose association of nations for conference purposes to the League. Harding won in a landslide, and the Republicans carried both houses of Congress. As President, Harding never presented the League to the Senate for ratification, and nothing more was ever heard of his "association of nations."

The Harding administration staffed the regulatory commissions and the judiciary with conservatives, raised the tariff, funded the inter-Allied debts, drastically reduced foreign immigration, broke some strikes by using court injunctions, defeated the veterans' bonus by presidential veto, gave moderate relief to farmers by establishment of the Intermediate Credit Banks and legislation which encouraged agricultural cooperatives, and set up the federal government's budget system. The Administration was plagued by widespread corruption, which involved the Attorney-General (who was the President's

closest friend and political adviser in the Cabinet), the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Interior, the Alien Property Custodian, and the head of the Veterans' Bureau. When Harding died in 1923, these scandals had not yet come to light.

KEEPING COOL WITH COOLIDGE

The succession of Vice-President Coolidge to the presidency was fortunate for the Republicans. Coolidge personified the conservative philosophy and the mood of the country. He believed in government economy, government encouragement to business, and a government hands-off policy with respect to other interests. His own probity and austerity made him immune to the scandals surrounding Harding, and he quietly dropped from his Administration those who had been involved. As Senate investigating committees brought more and more of the Harding administration's scandals to light, the nation refused to be shocked. The press treated the investigators more harshly than it did those who had defrauded the government. Prosperity was on the rise, and there must be no rocking of the boat, no jeopardizing of Coolidge's election.

The Republicans nominated Coolidge as a matter of course, but they had difficulties with the vice-presidential nomination. Senator Borah, Coolidge's choice, refused to be considered. In deference to the farm vote, the convention selected Lowden, but he flatly rejected the nomination. Then the convention chose Charles G. Dawes of Illinois, whose "Hell and Maria"² personality was not particularly pleasing to Coolidge.

What little chance the Democrats had was thrown away by the protracted fight in their Madison Square Garden convention. To make matters worse, the convention's antics were followed by a country-wide radio audience, for the campaign of 1924 was the first ever to be broadcast nationally. Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York and William G. McAdoo were the leading contenders. However, the differences which divided the convention were more cultural than political. McAdoo's supporters came largely from the

² Dawes, a General in WW I and later a congressional witness, was known for his salty manner.

South and the West, they were mostly Protestants and some were Klansmen, and McAdoo was a "dry." Smith was the son of immigrant parents, a Catholic, a "wet," anti-Klan, a product of Tammany, and the idol of the Eastern urban masses.

For over one hundred ballots the convention was hopelessly deadlocked. Finally, on the one-hundred-third ballot, the delegates turned to John W. Davis, nominally a favorite son from West Virginia but in reality a New York corporation lawyer who numbered J. P. Morgan among his clients. Davis was an urbane conservative gentleman who had been a congressman from West Virginia and ambassador to Great Britain under Wilson. To placate the populist-progressive elements of the West and South, the vice-presidential nomination went to Governor Charles W. Bryan of Nebraska, brother of William Jennings.

Dissatisfied liberals could support neither Coolidge nor Davis. The Conference for Progressive Political Action launched a new Progressive party, which nominated the aging Senator Robert M. La Follette for President and Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana as his running mate. Among other things, the platform stood for labor and farm legislation; public ownership of railroads, water power, and some other important natural resources; and a constitutional amendment to permit Congress to reenact a law over a Supreme Court veto. La Follette had the support of numerous intellectuals, liberal periodicals, the Non Partisan League, the Farmer-Labor party, the Socialist party, the railroad brotherhoods, the American Federation of Labor, and the La Follette machine in Wisconsin. The new party suffered the usual difficulties of third parties: too little money, too few practical politicians at the local levels, baffling legal obstacles to obtaining a place on the official ballot of each of the states. The discordant elements supporting La Follette did not work well together. Some wanted to "bust the trusts," others to nationalize them. The American Federation of Labor was not able to deliver its vote, for local labor leaders were reluctant to break

their covert alliances with the Democratic bosses in the cities.

The tide ran strongly for the Republicans. Even so, they waged a scare campaign. Their slogan was "Coolidge or Chaos." Their far-fetched argument ran like this: that La Follette might carry enough states to prevent a majority in the electoral college and thus the election would be thrown to the House of Representatives; that the House might fail to elect; that the coalition of Democrats and progressive farm-bloc Republicans in the Senate would probably elect Bryan Vice-President over Dawes; and that with no election in the House, Vice-President Charles W. Bryan would then become President! The Republicans also made much of the La Follette proposal to allow Congress to override a veto of the Supreme Court, and they warned that this would destroy America's system of constitutional government.

Coolidge won in another Republican landslide. Both houses of Congress were safely Republican. But La Follette's surprisingly large vote showed that liberal dissent was still vigorous. La Follette carried Wisconsin and placed second in eleven Western states. The popular vote for Davis was only slightly over eight million, that for La Follette, running on an improvised third party, was close to five million.

"RUM, ROMANISM, AND TAMMANY"

Coolidge twice vetoed the McNary-Haugen bill, which involved federal intervention to raise farm prices and was ardently backed by the farm organizations. In the face of the bull market's continued speculative and inflationary climb, the Coolidge administration took no action. Coolidge remained popular, and doubtless had he been a candidate in 1928 he would have been renominated and reelected. However, a year before the election he announced that he did "not choose to run." Perhaps he expected a draft, but instead his Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, whose helpfulness to business groups was widely acclaimed, began an active campaign for the nomination. Hoover's only opponents, a number of mediocre favorite

sons, were unable to make a combination to stop him. Hoover was easily nominated, and Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas was chosen as vice-presidential candidate.

Among the Democrats, there was one outstanding national favorite, Alfred E. Smith, who had survived repeated Republican *national* landslides to be elected Governor of New York four times. Only a miscellaneous field of favorite sons stood between Smith and the nomination. Democrats across the nation expected him to be nominated. To have turned him down would have been an insult to the Irish-Catholics, who had always been one of the main pillars of the Democratic party. In anticipation of Smith's sure nomination, the Democratic convention was taken to Houston, Texas, banner Baptist city of the South. Smith was nominated on the first ballot, and to balance the ticket Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, a "dry," and popular among his fellow southern politicians, was given second place on the ticket.

It is noteworthy that in 1928 both national conventions nominated the outstanding national favorite, in effect thereby ratifying the popular choice. This has been the predominant pattern of national conventions since.

How did the Democrats plan to break through the barrier against electing a Catholic as President at the very time when the voters identified the Republicans with the high prosperity and bull market? The Democrats expected to carry the important eastern states on the basis of Smith's appeal to the eastern urban masses. They expected to carry the border states and the South on the basis of traditional Democratic loyalty. In addition, they planned to make inroads on Republican strength in the farm belt and in the West by offering a more liberal farm program than their opponents and by stressing Smith's advocacy of public electric power. Throughout the country they would identify themselves with the bull market prosperity by advertising Smith's close personal friendship with some of the nation's most powerful financiers and corporate executives. Accordingly, John J. Raskob, a high executive in Dupont and in General Motors and a con-

spicuous "bull" operator, was made Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Raskob, in turn, brought to Smith's support other important business leaders.

However, the Democrats were unsuccessful in this Grand Strategy. In the metropolitan areas in the East and North, even many "wets" cast their votes for Hoover, in spite of his "dryness," in the belief that a continuation of the fabulous economic prosperity was more important than the wet-dry issue, and that Smith as President would not be able to end prohibition regardless. In the farm belt, although Republican Senator George W. Norris came out for Smith on the basis of the latter's farm and public power programs, the voters were repelled by Smith's Catholicism, "wetness," and Tammany connection.

Popular antagonism to "Rum, Romanism, and Tammany" was the decisive factor in Smith's loss of traditional Democratic territory—all of the border states and the five peripheral states of the South: Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, and Texas. Smith managed to salvage the cotton states of the deep South—South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas—because in these states, with higher percentages of Negroes, the concern to save the Democratic one-party system and white supremacy outweighed fear of a Catholic President and dislike for the "wets." The Negro "threat" was close at hand, the Catholic "threat" more remote.

Even in the face of the Hoover landslide, the Democratic vote in certain eastern and northern cities heavily populated with ethnic and religious minorities was higher than

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William G. Carleton, since his retirement in 1962, has devoted full time to writing and lecturing. Recent articles by Mr. Carleton have appeared in *Harper's*, the *Antioch Review*, the *Virginia Quarterly Review*, the *Yale Review* and the *American Scholar*. His well-known book, *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy*, was recently enlarged and reissued (New York: Random House, 1963).

F.D.R. and the Democratic Triumph

By JAMES T. PATTERSON

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"The trouble before Republican leaders is that prevailing conditions are bound to come to an end some time. When that time comes, I want to see the Democratic Party sanely radical enough to have most of the disgruntled ones turn to us to put us in power again."

THUS WROTE Franklin D. Roosevelt in January, 1929. His words were prophetic. Nine months later the stock market crash pushed the American economy into a precipitous decline, and in so doing inexorably revitalized a Democratic party which had been impotent for almost a decade. By 1936, the party indeed was "sanely radical enough" to attract enough disgruntled and forgotten voters into an invincible coalition which forced the G.O.P. into a "me-too" position, and drove both parties to accept a concept of state capitalism undreamed of seven years earlier.

In 1932, however, few thought in terms of these changes. Rather, both major parties set about the quadrennial task of nominating a man to coax the voters into line on election day.

For Republicans, this was a simple matter. President Herbert Hoover was far from popular in 1932. Blamed for the depression ("If you put a rose to his hand, it would wilt," said sculptor Gutzon Borglum), he aroused little enthusiasm at the Republican convention. But to have denied him a chance at a second term would have been to confess the failure of his administration. With resignation, the unhappy G.O.P. renominated the "Great Engineer."

Democrats had a much more difficult time.

Al Smith, their candidate in 1928, had the support of the "wet," northern element of the party. House Speaker John N. Garner of Texas had the backing of publisher William Randolph Hearst, as well as the California and Texas forces. And in the wings awaiting a deadlock was Newton Baker of Ohio, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of War.

Roosevelt, a powerful vote getter as governor of New York since 1929, had a sizeable lead as the convention began and cornered 661¼ votes on the first ballot, compared to 201¾ for Smith and 90¼ for Garner. But this was 100 votes shy of the necessary two-thirds, and in two succeeding ballots F.D.R. still had only 682¾ votes.

Fortunately for F.D.R., the opposition lacked unity. Hearst, disliking the internationally-minded Baker, urged Garner's forces to swing to Roosevelt. William G. McAdoo of California, anxious to heal party wounds and to gain revenge on Smith for depriving him of the 1924 nomination, was also favorably disposed to deal. Garner, yearning for Democratic victory, realized he had little chance of winning the nomination. Prodded neatly by promise of patronage, these men agreed to turn their forces to Roosevelt. On the fourth ballot Roosevelt won with ease. For his "reward," Garner was named F.D.R.'s running mate.

CAMPAIGN OF 1932

Compared to the excitement of the convention, the campaign was dull. Roosevelt aroused some enthusiasm with a speech he made in Chicago proclaiming "a new deal for the American people." Most of his major addresses, however, were vague and unspecific. Indeed, Roosevelt often sounded as conservative as his opponent. In Sioux City, he charged, "I accuse the present administration of being the greatest spending administration in peace times in all our history. It is an administration that has piled bureau upon bureau, commission on commission, and has failed to anticipate the needs and the reduced earning power of the people."

In this situation, it was not surprising that the liquor issue proved exciting. When the Democratic platform committee reported, "We advocate the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment," pandemonium shook the hall for twenty-five minutes. But it was a sad commentary on American politics that the problem of prohibition should have been so important in such a crisis. As one wag remarked sarcastically, it was absurd for a "wet" Democrat to vie with a "dry" one for liquor when neither could afford to buy a drink.

Despite the dullness of the campaign, the outcome was never in doubt. Hoover, to his everlasting bad fortune, happened to be the man on the spot, and the American people, then as always, blamed the President and his party for their troubles. According to a story prevalent at the time, Hoover asked his Secretary of the Treasury for a nickel to phone a friend. The Secretary's reply was, "Here's a dime. Call all your friends."

Almost as important, the contrast of personalities was striking. Beset with criticism, baffled at the nature of the crisis, Hoover withdrew into himself, snapped at friends and enemies alike, and found it all but impossible to smile in public. Roosevelt, on the other hand, was buoyant and optimistic. It did not matter to people that he offered no concrete program—what candidate ever had? But he did promise hope. His cheerful face,

his jaunty appearance, his casual wave of the hand, all promised better times for the future. As a campaigner, Roosevelt obviously enjoyed himself immensely, and the people responded eagerly to his warmth.

The result on election day was decisive. Carrying every state south and west of Pennsylvania, Roosevelt polled 22,820,000 votes to Hoover's 15,760,000, and received an Electoral College margin of 472–59. Norman Thomas, running on the Socialist ticket, received only 880,000 votes—a mark of the strength of the major parties even in economic crisis. Although Hoover had received 58.22% of the vote in 1928, he garnered but 39.65% in 1932, while Democratic percentages rose from 40.79 to 57.41. In essence, the figures revealed that Republicans had lost close to six million votes in four years, while the Democrats had gained nearly eight million. It was a gigantic shift of allegiance—a shift which up to 1964 was not reversed.

A NEW DEAL COALITION

While 1932 revealed a nationwide trend toward the Democratic party, the next three years witnessed a second major electoral development of the New Deal era: the addition of millions of "new" voters to the Democratic party. These voters—union men, Negroes, unemployed and relief workers, and poor farmers—comprised a powerful voting coalition, especially in the electorally crucial northern and midwestern cities. Though Al Smith had attracted some of these urban dwellers in 1928, it was not until the New Deal that they became a major factor in American elections.

Basically the reason for this development was the changing nature of the New Deal. Far from securing a consistent program in the "100 Days" of 1933, Roosevelt was even then torn between an honest desire to maintain fiscal orthodoxy and an equally deep-seated yearning to alleviate human misery. The result was considerable inconsistency, many false starts, and more than the usual administrative confusion. As the President admitted in explanation, "I have no intention of making a hit every time I come up to bat."

Yet his willingness to experiment led his administration far from the conservative sentiments expressed in 1932. The federal government, by 1936, was directly employing between two and four million men in New Deal work relief programs. Public works projects helped to employ millions more. A social security program offered hope of permanent government interest in the problems of the aged, destitute and unemployed.

The New Deal not only gained the affection of the unemployed but of many farmers and workers as well. Under various agricultural programs from 1933 to 1936, the government channeled billions of dollars to farmers. Under the Wagner Act—passed in 1935 despite Roosevelt's lack of enthusiasm—labor received the legal guarantees for collective bargaining that they long had desired. The drive for unionization reaped enormous successes; union membership of roughly three million in 1933 had leaped to more than seven million by 1937.

Also attracted to the New Deal were other less organized but no less important blocs. Various ethnic groups, particularly distressed by the depression, gained hope from the tolerance and direct aid which came from Washington. Many women voters were attracted not only by Roosevelt's general program but by the recognition he gave to women in his administration. Negroes deserted the party of Lincoln for the first time since the Civil War. Though Roosevelt neither sought nor received civil rights legislation at any time during his presidency, he obviously was sympathetic, and more important in the depression, he provided Negroes with jobs.

THE 1936 CAMPAIGN

With these factors at work, few observers doubted Democratic success in 1936. Nonetheless, the parties dutifully girded for the struggle. Democrats enthusiastically renominated the Roosevelt-Garner ticket, abolishing the two-thirds rule in the process. Republicans, disorganized, demoralized, and painfully aware of Roosevelt's popularity, named Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas as their standard-bearer.

The campaign, despite its lackluster character, revealed the immense changes in party ideology which had occurred within four years. Though Republican congressmen were by and large very conservative, both Landon and Frank Knox, his running mate, were formerly Bull-Moose Progressives, and their platform accepted much of the New Deal; in 1936, the G.O.P. paid the Democrats the supreme compliment of grudging emulation.

For his part, Roosevelt conducted such a relaxed campaign that one seasoned observer compared him to a bishop touring his diocese. As he once explained to Frances Perkins, a successful campaigner should avoid denunciations. He advised Democrats:

Call him [the opponent] the candidate of the Republican Party. Call him our opponent. Call him anything, but never call him bad names . . . and never mention his name. Many people, hundreds of people, just can't remember names. If they don't hear the opponent's name, that is clear gain for us.

Yet though he ignored Landon, Roosevelt's oratory contained a strident note missing in 1932. Angered by conservative opposition, he lashed out against "economic royalists." Closing his campaign with a mass rally in Madison Square Garden, he shocked conservatives by proclaiming, "I should like to have it said of my first administration that in it the forces of selfishness and of lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said of my second administration that in it these forces met their master."

The outcome was as expected; Roosevelt won a sweeping triumph, gaining 27,750,000 votes to Landon's 16,680,000, an eleven million plurality which has yet to be surpassed. A Union party ticket backed by various dissident elements and headed by Congressman William Lemke of North Dakota received only 890,000 votes. Roosevelt won 60.8% of the vote, compared with 57.4% four years before, and carried every state but Maine and Vermont for an Electoral College margin of 523-8. Running consistently ahead of his ticket (as he did in all his presidential races), he helped to sweep record congressional ma-

majorities into office; 331-89 in the House and 76-16 in the Senate. It was the most one-sided presidential victory in modern American history.

More significant for the future was the lesson of his triumph. Partly, his victory was due to drab Republican campaigning. As H. L. Mencken quipped of Landon, "the difference between his loudest shout and faintest whisper was probably no more than two decibels." Partly it was due to better times; clearly, the economic situation, though still serious, was improved over 1932. It was also due to Roosevelt's skillful use of radio and press conferences, a dimension to political campaigning never before exploited so well.

Most of all the triumph was Roosevelt's, and the voters who helped to give it to him were the newly awakened elements of the population. The total number of voters in 1936 was 45,600,000, some six million more than in 1932, and some five million of these voted for Roosevelt. Though these "forgotten men" were obviously not necessary for victory in 1936, they remained loyal to the New Deal in the close elections to come.

THE 1940 CONTEST

Shortly after the 1936 election, the Roosevelt magic began to fade. Seeking to "pack" the Supreme Court, he alienated large numbers of people, while violence in the ranks of labor prompted others to wish a return to more conservative ways. Lastly, a sharp recession in 1937-1938 indicated that the New Deal had not entirely succeeded in solving the economic problems of the country. In the 1938 congressional elections, Republicans made their first gains since 1928, winning eight new seats in the Senate and eighty in the House. The G.O.P. took heart as the 1940 campaign approached.

Neither party was sure who its nominee would be. Roosevelt refused to commit himself to a third term: "I want to go home to Hyde Park," he told a friend. "I want to finish my little house on the hill. I want to write history. No, I just can't do it. . . ."

It is hard to say how seriously Roosevelt meant such statements, but when France fell

to the Nazis in June, 1940, it was clear that no other Democrat had the stature or experience to handle the crisis in foreign affairs. Roosevelt refused to let the convention know he was willing to stand again, but the delegates, galvanized by shouts of WE WANT ROOSEVELT emanating from planted voices broadcast from the cellar of the hall, chose him for a third term.

Republicans had an even more difficult time. At the beginning of the year, the leading G.O.P. hopefuls were Thomas E. Dewey, the crusading district attorney of New York City; Robert A. Taft of Ohio, a Senator since 1939; and long-time Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan. Most pundits talked of a Dewey-Taft confrontation at the convention.

In so doing, they reckoned without the changing world situation. As the Nazis swept over Europe, the young and inexperienced Dewey ("Buster," his critics called him) appeared less and less to be the man for the job. Taft and Vandenberg, staunch isolationists, seemed unsuited for the handling of foreign affairs. More important, Wendell Willkie, an Indianan with Wall Street connections who had first attracted attention as the leading utility executive opposed to the TVA, gained astonishing last-minute support.

Articulate, intelligent, avidly internationalist, Willkie became the candidate of the more liberal urban wing of the party, the future "Eisenhower Republicans." Though Willkie in May, 1940, had no delegate support, and though he had been a Democrat only a few years earlier, the enthusiasm engendered by his name, combined with his influential backing, gave him the nomination on the sixth ballot.

The campaign which followed was perhaps the most hotly contested of the New Deal years. Willkie excited rank and file Republicans as no man had done since the heyday of Theodore Roosevelt. Nevertheless, he was unable to make his denunciation of Roosevelt's effort to gain an unprecedented third term pay off. Realizing that the New Deal was generally popular, he found it impossible to attack successfully Roosevelt's do-

mestic policy. A political amateur, his campaign suffered from lack of organization. But most important, as an internationalist, he was unable to offer a meaningful alternative to the foreign policy program offered by the Roosevelt administration.

On election day, Roosevelt won a third term, receiving 27,250,000 votes to Willkie's 22,300,000, and capturing the Electoral College, 449-82. Though the result was much closer than in 1932 and 1936, it was still a substantial triumph. His winning percentage was 54.69 compared to 57.4% in 1932 and 60.8% in 1936; indeed, he lost some 450,000 votes, while Willkie, making inroads in the Midwest and Great Plains, improved on Landon's total vote by close to six million votes. If 433,940 votes in 14 key states had shifted, Willkie would have had an Electoral College victory.

Unquestionably, the main reason for the Democratic triumph was, once again, Roosevelt's personality; many voters felt that he was the best man to handle the foreign situation. Yet the election also revealed, even more than in 1936, the importance of the new Democratic electoral coalition. Though the President's internationalist foreign policy cost him votes among previously loyal Irish and German-Americans, and though more prosperous farmers turned to Willkie, F.D.R.'s strength in the lower class urban wards was decisive. Foreign policy was a real and divisive issue, but it was Roosevelt's urban coalition which remained the key to the electoral triumph.

Equally revealing, the 1940 campaign indicated that the New Deal was here to stay. From then through 1960, neither party dared assault the New Deal's main outlines in presidential campaigns. Similarly, Willkie's internationalism suggested the striking change which had occurred in the G.O.P. on foreign policy matters as well. In these few years, both major parties had accepted considerable governmental intervention in the domestic economy and an internationalist posture toward the world. These were marked and lasting shifts which few similar eras in American history have duplicated.

THE 1940-1944 PERIOD

Roosevelt from 1941 to 1944 exchanged the title of "Dr. New Deal," as he put it, to "Dr. Win the War." Even though Republicans gained in the 1942 elections, party warfare, if not forgotten, was restrained during the years before the 1944 presidential campaign. Thus, when Republicans nominated Dewey in 1944, they did so with relatively little fanfare.

Indeed, Dewey, then governor of New York, faced little opposition by convention time. Willkie's support of Roosevelt's war programs had already distressed G.O.P. leaders. Harold Stassen of Minnesota, another early contender, also aroused little enthusiasm, while General Douglas MacArthur eventually withdrew his name before the convention. Dewey won easily on the first ballot, and the delegates then chose Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio as his running mate on the ticket.

For the Democrats, there was none of the suspense which preceded the 1940 convention; Roosevelt was the obvious choice. But the vice-presidential nomination, both because of Roosevelt's health and because of general dissatisfaction with Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, loomed as an unusually tempting prize. At first, Roosevelt appeared to favor James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, an able moderate who had served as a kind of "assistant president" during much of the war. But when the convention assembled, labor leaders insisted that Byrnes was unacceptable. Byrnes, they argued, as a former Catholic who had converted to Protestantism, and as a southerner hostile to race legislation, would alienate the important Catholic and Negro vote in the northern cities.

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James T. Patterson, in addition to preparing for an academic career in history, has worked as a reporter on the *Hartford Courant*. He has recently published an article on the minimum wage movement in *Labor History* and is presently at work on a book on the "Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939."

Analyzing the role of the two postwar Presidents in office prior to the 1960's, this historian says, "Both Truman and Eisenhower rendered a distinct contribution during their terms of office. Truman served as the Free World's postwar champion in defense of its liberties. . . . Eisenhower gave the American scene a political serenity which it had not experienced since the inception of the New Deal."

Truman and Eisenhower: Their Administrations and Campaigns

By VICTOR ALBJERG
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WHEN PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, in January, 1944, informed Admiral William Leahy of his intention to name Senator Harry S. Truman as his running mate in the ensuing campaign, the old-sea dog inquired, "Who in the hell is Truman?" This expostulation was less an indication of Truman's anonymity than it was of Leahy's ignorance. Lord Halifax had Truman more precisely identified as "the sort of person we would like to go hunting tigers with."

Upon becoming President, Truman needed all his stealth and courage, for he faced formidable problems and fearless opponents. With the close of the war and the end of danger, the public gave vent to all of its annoyances. With raucous insistence it demanded all the blessings of peace without surrendering any of the profits of war. It wanted an open market and cheaper commodities, greater freedom and more restrictions, larger subsidies and lower taxes. It gloried in victory, yet trembled in fear. Some believed that the country was on *The Road To Serfdom*, while others anticipated *The Affluent Society*. In this atmosphere of contradiction, the Truman era became an "Age

of gold and ashes, of triumph and disaster . . . a daydream or a nightmare."

What intensified Truman's trials was the Republican resolve to recapture power. The long years in political exile had not indoctrinated the ostracized with the etiquette of heaven and, after a brief honeymoon, the Republicans did not allow scruples to inhibit their efforts to discredit the new occupant of the White House.

Truman soon sensed the sanguinary mood; he implored Senator Harley Kilgore of West Virginia: "Pray for me." Truman needed comfort from whatever source it might come, because all the discontented used him as the national whipping boy. He had not been President long before he wrote his aged mother, "This is a hell of a job." Public opinion polls reflected his vanishing popularity: from a high of 87 per cent soon after he took office (3 per cent higher than any ever accorded Franklin Roosevelt) support fell to 32 per cent in the fall of 1946.

This mood gave the Republicans a majority of 28 in the House and 2 in the Senate in the midterm election of 1946, and enabled the Eightieth Congress to defeat most of Truman's legislative program. He coun-

terattacked with vetoes, 250 during his seven years, exceeded only by 631 by Franklin Roosevelt, and 374 by Cleveland. The battle lines between Truman and Congress were early and clearly drawn and each was always ready to kick the other in the political groin.

THE 1948 CONVENTIONS

In this atmosphere, the Republican national nominating convention assembled in June, 1948, in Philadelphia, and in cheerful optimism drafted a platform which endorsed the Marshall Plan, collective security and a bipartisan foreign policy. On civil rights it endorsed "equal opportunities to work," denounced lynching and favored repeal of poll taxes as qualifications for voting. It approved the Taft-Hartley Act, but to allay labor hostility, it promised a "continuing study of labor-management legislation."

The two leading candidates for the Republican nomination were Thomas E. Dewey, governor of New York, who led the liberal-internationalist wing of the party, and Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, who headed the conservative-isolationist element.

Dewey arrived in Philadelphia with a skillful and efficient general staff which outmaneuvered the Taft delegation.

Candidates	Ballot #1
Dewey	434
Taft	224
Stassen	157
Vandenberg	62
Warren	59

The second ballot gave Dewey 515 votes, 33 short of the 548 needed. His rivals then conceded their chances as hopeless, and the convention, on the third ballot, acclaimed Dewey unanimously nominated. In the first postwar nomination for the presidency, the conservatives had been beaten.

When the Democrats convened in July, also in Philadelphia, they were in a melancholy mood. Many influential delegates regarded Truman as a political liability, and had hoped that he would retire. Before the

delegates assembled, some of them had invited General Dwight Eisenhower to accept the nomination, but he had declined. Then they had approached Associate Justice William O. Douglas of the Supreme Court, and he, too, was disinterested. To their dismay, the Democrats were stuck with Harry Truman.

Truman lacked the ingratiating quality which inspires others to sacrifice themselves in their leader's cause. His speeches did not, like those of Gladstone, "summon a squad of recording angels who took down his words in breathless ecstasy;" nor could he stir his listeners as did Lloyd George, who "made the House of Commons his chapel and all England his congregation." Despite his lack of eloquence, Truman was in a strong position for, as President and head of the party, he could exercise a powerful influence in selecting the head of the ticket.

In dependency, the platform committee drafted planks that called for strong civil rights legislation, repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, increased social security, health insurance, aid to farmers, measures against inflation, generous provision for federal housing, and liberal aid to education.

There was little difference between the platforms of the two major parties in the period after World War II. They duplicated each other in almost all fundamentals, verifying the thesis that we no longer had two political parties, but only one, with two factions.

The convention, without alternative or enthusiasm, gave Truman 947.5 votes on the first ballot, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia 263, and Paul V. McNutt, former governor of Indiana, one-half a vote. Truman's choice for the vice-presidency was Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, favorably known for his eloquence and integrity.


THE CAMPAIGN OF 1948

Then began one of the most dramatic and colorful political campaigns in American history. All the cards seemed stacked against Truman. At the beginning of the campaign the odds were eight to one against him.

Ninety per cent of the nation's press opposed him. Public opinion polls had all but installed Dewey in the White House. In the Republican organization, there was order and efficiency, in the Democratic camp, there was organized confusion and systematic chaos. It seemed as if Truman might as well have conceded victory by default. One newsman indeed queried: "How long is Dewey going to tolerate Truman's interference in the government?"

In the campaign that followed, Dewey traveled 16,000 miles and delivered 170 speeches in deep "cathedral tones," suggestive of benevolence, wisdom and confidence. Since the press and the polls all assured him victory, he pursued a leisurely campaign. The tenor of his speeches was that the demands of the presidency were beyond the capacities of Truman, that under his administration the country was demoralized with treason and corruption, and that he, Dewey, was the political engineer who could set things right. Considerably before the election date his prospective high administrative officials engaged living quarters in Washington, while high ranking Democratic bureaucrats scanned the employment horizon.

Rarely has a presidential candidate fought a sharper uphill battle, with less encouragement. Eleanor Roosevelt at first withheld support. Her sons endorsed other candidates. Bernard Baruch and other previously generous contributors knotted their purse strings. Several members of the cabinet refused to participate in the campaign. Against all this discouragement, and much more, Truman whistle-stopped 31,739 miles and, in 355 speeches, flailed the Eightieth Congress as the "Do-Nothing Congress." It was a Republican Congress, a "Special-Privilege-Congress" that protected and promoted the interests of the few. If the people elected a Republican administration they could expect the same brand of favoritism for the few, and indifference toward and exploitation of the many. In a rousing "give 'em hell" campaign he denounced the Republicans as "Wall Street Barons," "gluttons of privilege," and "tapeworms." "If you let



the Republicans get control of the government," he said, "you will be making America an economic colony of Wall Street."

Truman encountered serious defections. Governor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, resenting the civil rights plank and Truman's endorsement of it, bolted and led a Dixie faction out of the convention. This cost Truman 38 electoral votes from South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, and one from Tennessee. Henry Wallace, vice-president under Roosevelt (1941-1945), and Secretary of Commerce under Truman, also broke away, with a following of left-wing New Dealers. This involved the loss of New York for Truman. In spite of all these handicaps, on November 3, 1948, Truman scored the biggest election upset in American history. Truman won 49.5 per cent of the popular vote and Dewey gained 45.1 per cent. (See Figure 1.)

Candidates	Popular vote
Truman	24,105,605
Dewey	21,696,170
Thurmond	1,169,021
Wallace	1,156,103

Truman's victory made him feel that he was no longer President by accident, but king in his own name. And as for Dewey, he confessed that he felt like a man "who had been buried in a coffin with a lily in his hand, and said to himself, 'What am I doing

here? And if I am dead, why do I have to go to the bathroom?"

TRUMAN'S ADMINISTRATION

After Truman's spectacular success, he was determined to forge a unified party with unquestioned loyalty to himself and his program. To achieve this, he had to dismiss those who had differed with him publicly, and those who had refused to cooperate. During his seven years in the presidency he cashiered 34 cabinet members. Franklin Roosevelt during a tenure of twelve years, replaced 25.

Truman also wanted an administration that would bear the stamp of his personality and accomplishments. Thus, in January, 1949, he introduced his Fair Deal program, calling for considerable extension of the New Deal. But the Eighty-First Congress, dominated by Democratic majorities in both houses, nonetheless faced a coalition of Dixiecrat Democrats, who opposed northern solution to southern problems, and northern Republicans, who felt surfeited with New Deal legislation. This coalition mutilated his program. In spite of ambushes and frontal attacks from this coalition, Truman managed to elevate minimum wages from 40 to 75 cents an hour, to provide for the construction of 800,000 housing units, and to force the enactment of a new social security bill which placed an additional 10,000,000 people under its benefits.

As a legislative leader, Truman was not a success. He could neither entice Congress to cooperate nor command it to submit. Though he presented sound and comprehensive legislative programs, the Hill regarded them chiefly as targets for attack. And when a program had been rejected Truman did not reduce its dimensions for the next session of Congress, but presented another program of equal and similar scope, only to have it, too, discarded. Truman lacked the wheedling appeal, the flattering witchery, the insinuating threat and the commanding voice of his immediate predecessor.

Truman scored his greatest triumph in foreign affairs, where an enlightened world

view, and courageous, intelligent and decisive action were requisites. He believed that American security could be safeguarded only by limiting the expansive territorial tradition of Russia. Cognizant of the fact that from 1500 to 1914 the Muscovites had annexed an average of 50 square miles a day, and that before World War I Russia was already so large that it took the sun 11 hours to cross it, Truman set out to contain Stalin's acquisitive instincts. To this end Truman girdled the Soviet Union with upwards of 200 naval, military and air bases, staffed with 1,500,000 men. On some bases, American planes carrying atomic war heads were kept constantly in the air, under orders to penetrate Russia and unload their cargoes, if and when so directed.

When European countries tottered between capitalism and communism, Truman injected more than \$41 billion into the world's rickety economic systems. Communist party memberships declined to Stalin's amazement, as the voices of the common people could be heard above the din of whirling production.

When, on June 24, 1948, the Russians stopped all land and water transportation from West Germany to West Berlin, Truman acted decisively. He organized an airlift of British and American planes which supplied West Berlin with 8,000 tons of commodities daily. For a period of 324 days a plane landed in West Berlin every two minutes. This enterprise cost the British seven planes, and the Americans seventeen. Forty-eight airmen lost their lives. However, Truman demonstrated American determination to remain in West Berlin, and on May 12, 1949, the Russians lifted the blockade. Had the West evacuated Berlin, the Russians surely would have applied their pressure formula elsewhere along their boundary.

The Berlin Blockade aroused the West to the necessity of joint action against further Russian threats, and out of this crystallized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, negotiated April 4, 1949. In September, 1949, Congress passed the Mutual Security Act, through which the United States supplied

the European countries with vast quantities of arms and ammunition. The hope that NATO eventually would have an army of 70 divisions has never materialized.

Truman acted in Korea with similar vigor. On June 24, 1950, the North Koreans crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, the established boundary between the two sections of the country. On learning of the incursion, Truman, acting exclusively on his executive authority, ordered American troops to repel the advancing Koreans. Later, Congress and the Security Council of the United Nations endorsed his action, and an international army of detachments from a dozen countries were placed under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. When MacArthur, with the approval of Truman and the United Nations, invaded North Korea, a Chinese Communist army of 200,000 men came to the assistance of the North Koreans and administered a severe defeat to his forces.

MacArthur publicly blamed the Pentagon for this disaster, and demanded "total victory." This would involve—(1)—bombing of military installations in Manchuria, (2) crossing the Yalu River, (3) blockade of China, (4) use of Formosa as a military base against China. MacArthur communicated his proposals to Joseph Martin, minority leader in the House of Representatives and to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. In so doing, he challenged civilian supremacy and Truman, on April 11, 1951, dismissed him from his command.

The Korean War was finally brought to a close on July 23, 1953. By that time it had cost the United States \$22 billion, and 150,000 casualties, among whom were 33,000 dead. The most significant consequence of the war was that it salvaged the United Nations from the ignominious fate of the League of Nations which had resulted from its ineffectiveness in the 1931 Manchurian crisis.

THE 1952 CAMPAIGN

On March 29, 1952, at a Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, Truman announced his determination not to seek another term. Senators Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, Richard Rus-

sell of Georgia, Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, and Alben Barkley of Kentucky, as well as former Governor Averell Harriman of New York, announced their candidacies. Reluctantly and belatedly, former Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois joined them.

Stevenson possessed a nobility of character and devotion to his country rarely found in American politics: he had a scorn and contempt for the chicanery, jobbery and deals of its disreputable side. He was articulate as few candidates have been, with an integrity which few candidates share. Thus, championing civil rights before a Virginia audience, he declared, "I should earn your contempt if I talked one way in the South, and if I talked another way elsewhere. I shall not go anywhere with beguiling serpent words." With equal candor, he told an American Legion audience that its physically able members had no claim on the American treasury.

The majority of the Democratic delegates appreciated Stevenson's forthright character as revealed by the nominating convention of 1952.

Candidates	Ballot # 1	Ballot # 2	Ballot # 3
Kefauver	340	362.5	275.5
Stevenson	273	324.5	617.5
Russell	268		261
Harriman	65		
Barkley	48.5		67.5

On the day following the nomination of Stevenson, the convention chose Senator John Sparkman of Alabama as the vice-presidential candidate.

The Republican nominating convention met in Chicago in July, 1952. The two leading candidates were Senator Robert Taft and General Dwight Eisenhower. Taft was a conservative isolationist; he also endorsed the broadside accusations of communism which Senator Joseph McCarthy leveled at many who were innocent.

Eisenhower was an internationalist and right of center in domestic affairs. He was the choice of Henry Cabot Lodge, Thomas E.

Dewey and Senators James Duff of Pennsylvania and Frank Carlson of Kansas who promoted him not so much for his principles as for his prospects as a winner. He was the national hero.

Before the convention assembled, Taft claimed the support of some 600 delegates with 604 needed for the nomination, and, what was more, he controlled the national committee. It chose Walter Hallahan as temporary chairman; Joseph Martin, former speaker of the House, as permanent chairman; and General Douglas MacArthur as keynoter. Superficially the convention appeared to be organized to nominate Taft.

The Taft crowd, however, had not reckoned accurately with the Eisenhower supporters. The latter contested Taft delegations, substituted their own, and drew enthusiastic support from the uncommitted delegates. On the first ballot, Eisenhower was within whispering distance of nomination.


Candidates	Ballot #1
Eisenhower	595
Taft	500
Warren	81
Stassen	20
MacArthur	10

Upon announcement of the results of the first ballot, the Minnesota delegation shifted its votes from Stassen to Eisenhower. This ignited a bandwagon stampede which gave Eisenhower the nomination on the first ballot. Again, the conservative wing of the party went down to defeat.

Eisenhower's choice as running mate was Richard Nixon of California, who had served in the House and currently was a member of the Senate. He was 39 years of age, while Eisenhower was 60.

There was a striking similarity between the platforms of the two parties in 1952, but there were differences as well. The Republicans devoted much space to denunciation of Truman, especially to corruption and communism in his administration. Furthermore, they upheld the Taft-Hartley Act, while the Democrats demanded its repeal. Each party

FIGURE II

Election of 1952*Electoral Vote*

■ Eisenhower 442 ▨ Stevenson 89

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strove to outbid the other with favors, and this was especially noticeable in their efforts to win the support of the farmers. Stevenson promised them 90 per cent of parity, and Eisenhower at Kasson, Minnesota, assured them of 100 per cent.

In a turbulent world, Eisenhower conveyed what most Americans craved: simple answers to complicated questions, and the assurance that they could commit their vexations and problems to his custody.

Stevenson gave fewer speeches than Eisenhower, but of higher quality. His scintillating wit, penetrating analysis and obvious integrity appealed to the élite, but aroused the suspicion of many.

Candidates	Popular vote
Eisenhower	33,824,351
Stevenson	27,314,987

Stevenson carried the nine states of South and North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, West Virginia and Kentucky. Eisenhower carried thirty-nine states, and among them were four southern commonwealths: Texas, Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia. Eisenhower won 55 percent of the popular vote while Stevenson carried 45 per cent. (See figure 2.)

EISENHOWER'S ADMINISTRATION

Eisenhower viewed the presidency as an agency of strictly limited powers. He maintained that Roosevelt and Truman had

SUMMARY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S FINANCES 1945-1956

Year	Receipts	In Billions of Dollars (000 omitted)		1947-1949 = 100 (000,000 omitted) National Income	Price Index	Billions of Dollars (1961 prices) Gross National Production
		Expenditures	Surplus or Deficit			
1945	44,475,304	98,058,708	- 53,423,393	181,200,000	68.8	373.8
1946	39,771,404	60,447,574	- 20,676,171	180.9	78.7	325.4
1947	39,786,181	39,032,393	753,788	198	96.4	324.9
1948	41,488,179	33,068,709	8,419,470	223	104.4	337.5
1949	37,695,549	39,506,989	- 1,811,440	217	99.2	338.3
1950	36,494,901	39,617,003	- 3,122,102	241	103.1	366.5
1951	47,567,613	44,057,831	3,509,783	279.3	114.8	396.5
1952	61,390,945	65,407,585	- 4,016,640	292.2	111.6	411.7
1953	64,825,044	74,274,257	- 9,274,213	305.6	110.1	430.6
1954	64,655,387	67,772,353	- 3,116,966	301.8	110.3	422.0
1955	60,389,744	64,569,973	- 4,180,229	330.2	110.7	455.1
1956	68,165,744	66,539,776	1,625,553	349.4	114.3	464.8

usurped authority which legally was not theirs, and, therefore, had distorted the central administration. He pledged himself to restore the equilibrium which previously had prevailed among the top branches of the government. He also pledged himself to stop the encroachment of federal power over the states.

Several factors account for this approach. Eisenhower's repeated illnesses compelled him to delegate authority, and no President ever delegated so much. What was more significant, he transferred to the White House his barracks organization. As President, he viewed his role as that of a commanding officer of a vast army, with Sherman Adams as his chief of staff, and cabinet members as corps commanders. During the first period of his administration, he believed that his function consisted primarily in issuing orders for his lieutenants to execute. Instead of prosecuting an energetic policy as he had promised, he indulged in a dynamic languor. He frequently referred to his administration as a crusade, but his evangelism never acquired hallelujah fervor.

In conformity with his desire to reduce the powers and functions of the federal Government, he removed many of the remaining

economic controls which had been imposed during the Korean War. He secured a bill which assigned the tidelands oil region to the states, enabling private entrepreneurs to exploit their resources. He was determined to halt what he called the "creeping socialism" which he thought had advanced too far into the American economic system. The Tennessee Valley Authority, in particular, was the object of his animosity. In one cabinet meeting he exclaimed: "By God, if ever we could do it, before we leave here, I'd like to sell the whole thing."

He believed that an unbalanced budget and deficit spending were not only unsound, but immoral. Although he aimed to effect a balanced budget during the early part of his administration, this was deferred until the last year of his first term of office. (See summary of federal finances above.)

In the matter of integration, Eisenhower was reluctant to act unless intervention was unavoidable. In 1954, the Supreme Court had decreed that segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. Two years later, when Autherine Lucy, a Negro girl, had been admitted to the University of Alabama by court order, and expelled the following day, Eisenhower took no action against the local defi-


ance. Also in 1956, when speaking to a Florida audience, he endorsed southern solution of southern problems. However, when Governor Orville Faubus of Arkansas prevented Negroes from attending public schools, Eisenhower called out the Regular Army to compel compliance with the Supreme Court's decision.

Eisenhower was a devoted advocate of peace. Pursuing that goal, he continued Truman's containment policy; maintaining that approach, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles traveled 500,000 miles and visited 46 countries. After the death of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and the American appreciation of a less militant Soviet mood, Eisenhower shifted from containment to a policy of co-existence. In 1955, Eisenhower attended the Geneva summit conference with representatives of Russia, England, and France. There each delegate effusively accorded the others expressions of goodwill and announced their devotion to peace. Simultaneously, each proposed plans which he knew in advance the other would reject. Eisenhower offered the Russians permission to execute aerial inspection of the United States if the Russians would reciprocate. This was the diplomacy of embarrassment. But it was less militant and after 1955, tension and suspicion between Moscow and Washington declined.

Eisenhower remained extremely popular throughout his entire administration and it was no surprise to anyone that on August 17, 1956, he and Richard Nixon were unanimously renominated.

The two principal challengers to Stevenson's renomination as the Democratic standard-bearer in 1956 once again were Senator Kefauver and Governor Harriman. However, Kefauver withdrew from the race in July and, by August 16, Stevenson commanded enough support to win the nomination on the first ballot with 905.5 votes, over 210 for Governor Harriman. After a hard inter-party fight, Senator Kefauver wrested the nomination for vice-president from the then Senator John F. Kennedy on the second ballot.

History repeated itself and once again



Outline map by R. M. Hebbard

Eisenhower and Nixon won. (See figure 3.)

Both Truman and Eisenhower rendered a distinct contribution during their terms of office. Truman served as the Free World's postwar champion in defense of its liberties. He sacrificed American resources, and, when necessary, American lives, to repel totalitarianism. To the relief of the Americans and the chagrin of the Russians, the United States experienced no postwar depression. On the contrary, production rose to ever higher levels. Although there was internal conflict, Truman held the country together.

Eisenhower gave the American scene a political serenity which it had not experienced since the inception of the New Deal. Without having contributed to the denouement of Senator Joseph McCarthy, Eisenhower favored the Senate's censure of him, and with the decline of McCarthy's ideas, the country moved into a deeper calm. Certainly, Eisenhower's acceptance of the social program of his two predecessors clinched the twentieth century revolution in the United States.

Victor Albjerg began his academic career in the public schools and served as a teacher and school superintendent before joining the History Department of Purdue University in 1926. He remained at Purdue until 1963 when he began his duties at St. Norbert College. In 1962, he won a John Hay Whitney Fellowship.

After analyzing the build-up to the 1960 election and reviewing the Kennedy administration years, this writer concludes that "The Johnson-Goldwater contest afforded Americans the first real opportunity in a generation to approve or reject . . . the trend toward measured deliberateness, or 'realism' in foreign policy . . . the renewed trend toward employing governmental power to enforce equality of status for minority groups . . . and the trend toward a more socially conscious economic system. . . ."

The 1960's: The Issues and the Candidates

By J. JOSEPH HUTHMACHER

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SPUTNIKS, mounting racial tensions, and a sluggish economy—these were the disturbing problems that intruded on the consciousness of the American people and disrupted the mood of confidence after the fall of 1957. Just a year earlier, Americans had voted for four more years of "modern Republicanism." Now not only liberal intellectuals who authored books like John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society*, but pundits like Walter Lippmann, who had been among General Eisenhower's warmest supporters in 1952, wondered whether the President's brand of "moderate progressivism" had sufficed to prepare the nation for the challenges it faced both abroad and at home. By 1960 the quest to delineate anew the "national purpose" had become almost a national preoccupation.

The need for self-examination became even more compelling as Americans faced once again the selection of leaders to guide them during the next four years. For if a thaw in the cold war had brightened the electoral contest of 1956, a revival of icy winds from abroad now promised to chill the 1960 drama. The "spirit of Camp David" was snuffed out decisively early in May of the election year. Just two weeks before the scheduled open-

ing of the summit conference on Berlin, the Russians shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane deep inside Soviet territory. When the Big Four heads of state assembled in Paris, Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev exploded in a tirade against the United States' "piratical" and "thief-like" tactics, heaped personal abuse on President Eisenhower, and insisted that the summit meeting be postponed until such time as "another United States government will understand the futility of pursuing aggressive policies."

Nor was the U-2 affair the only development that troubled United States foreign relations that spring and summer. During the next few months, the current series of American-Russian disarmament talks collapsed; Fidel Castro's Cuba veered unmistakably toward the Communist camp; friendly governments in Turkey and South Korea were threatened with violent overthrow; bloodshed spread in the newly-independent African Congo; fighting in Laos ended the uneasy truce that had been maintained in Southeast Asia since 1954; and Dwight Eisenhower, embarked on his last good-will tour as President, was advised not to visit Tokyo because of the anti-American spirit rampant there.

As Republicans prepared to choose a new

standard bearer, and as Democrats gathered to nominate an opponent, the nation's plight seemed darker to some observers than at any earlier point in the cold war. Never before had the Communist menace attained such globe-girdling proportions—to say nothing of the challenge in outer space. Not since the Great Depression had the country faced domestic problems so pressing as those posed by economic stagnation, agitation over social needs, and the explosive civil rights issue.

Few Americans were more perturbed by the difficulties that beset the nation in the closing phases of the Eisenhower administration than Nelson Rockefeller, the outspoken liberal Republican whose election to the governorship of New York had been one of the bright spots for the GOP in the otherwise dismal midterm election results of 1958. During 1959, Rockefeller explored the feasibility of seeking the party's presidential nomination; Republican conservatives breathed easier when, in December, the Governor withdrew his candidacy, making the way clearer for the front-running contender, the Vice-President, Richard Nixon. Nevertheless, in June, 1960, Rockefeller issued a sweeping statement indicating specific positions which he felt the Republican platform must take on such vital matters as national defense, foreign aid, economic growth and civil rights; positions which, by proposing vast new federal expenditures of effort and money, implied substantial criticism of the Eisenhower administration.

At a meeting in the Governor's New York City apartment a few weeks later, on the eve of the Republican convention, Vice-President Nixon acceded to many of Rockefeller's demands. Republican conservatives were incensed, particularly because the convention's Platform Committee, which they dominated, had already finished its work. Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, the idol of the GOP's right wing, denounced the Nixon-Rockefeller conference as the "Munich of the Republican Party." President Eisenhower fumed. In the end, however, Nixon persuaded the convention to accept a consid-

erable part of the "Compact of Fifth Avenue." When the delegates nominated him a few days later, the Vice-President entered the campaign on a platform which in some ways repudiated the Administration he had served for eight years.

Meanwhile the Democrats, even more anxious than Rockefeller Republicans to break the "Eisenhower equilibrium," were busily selecting their candidate. The most active contestants for the party's nomination in 1960 were three United States senators: John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, and Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas. In April, Kennedy bested Humphrey in the Wisconsin primary but his victory was marred by the fact that he carried only those areas where his Catholic co-religionists were most numerous. However, that blemish was removed five weeks later when, in overwhelmingly Protestant West Virginia, Kennedy scored a clear-cut primary triumph over the Minnesota senator.

Humphrey thereupon withdrew, and when Kennedy's forces arrived at the Los Angeles site of the convention in mid-July, they claimed to have more than 600 of the 761 votes needed for the nomination. During the next few days, Senator Johnson's efforts to win delegates from outside his native South proved disappointing, while the avid campaigning of Kennedy and his numerous clan added to his strength. A drive on behalf of Adlai Stevenson, handicapped at the outset by Stevenson's own unresponsiveness, picked up momentum when the two-time nominee indicated that he would accept a draft to run again. But Stevenson's decision had been delayed too long; on the first roll call the Massachusetts lawmaker won the prize. And, at Kennedy's request, Lyndon Johnson was named his running mate.

THE 1960 CAMPAIGN

John Kennedy's nomination for the presidency automatically revived all the arguments about Americanism and religion that marked the presidential campaign of 1928. Once again, some prominent Protestant clergymen

expressed public doubt regarding the wisdom of entrusting the White House to a Catholic; once again there were subterranean efforts to arouse religious prejudice. But the candidate met the issue head-on, and in a forthright address to an assemblage of ministers in Houston during September, Kennedy demonstrated forcefully that he was a firm believer in the principle of Church-State separation.

For his own part, the Democratic candidate preferred to emphasize what he regarded as his real mission in the campaign—to stir the electorate into a mood that would “get America moving again.” In effect, Kennedy fashioned his appeal along the lines that the Galbraiths, the Lippmanns, and the Rockefeller had drawn since 1957. Yet the Massachusetts senator made his own distinctive contribution to their cause, for his youth and vigor imparted a dynamism that other men could not convey. Kennedy coined the phrase that aptly described the challenges which, in the dissidents’ opinion, the Republican administration had too long neglected. The fight against ignorance, disease, poverty and discrimination both at home and abroad, he said, and the need to safeguard the nation’s security without the catastrophe of nuclear war, constituted a “New Frontier” which Americans must pioneer with renewed national effort.

Vice-President Nixon tended, at first, to portray Kennedy and his allies as “prophets of doom and gloom.” Yet, in view of Nixon’s own vital concern with the problems which the nation had recently encountered, the Republican nominee could not in good conscience totally disagree with the Democratic analysis. The differences between himself and Kennedy were based on method and degree, he insisted, rather than on principle or philosophy. As a necessary consequence of his position, Nixon soon found himself reiterating much of what his opponent had already said; inevitably he was placed in the uncomfortable position of yielding the campaign initiative to Kennedy.

The Vice-President felt confident, nonetheless, that his greater experience in hold-

ing administrative office and in the actual conduct of foreign relations—qualifications shared by his running mate, former United Nations Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge—would be credentials enough to insure victory for the Republican ticket. And for a while the samplers of public opinion agreed.

As the campaign wore on, it seemed to a good many Americans that the personality characteristics and personal abilities of the candidates, rather than issues or principles, were the basis for the choice they were about to make. For this reason, the series of face-to-face debates between Kennedy and Nixon, broadcast live to millions of television viewers, assumed such importance as to mark perhaps the decisive turning point of the campaign. The presentations by the two candidates failed to cast much light on the issues that separated their parties, but the young Massachusetts senator handled himself so well in the give and take of the encounters that Nixon’s claims to greater maturity and to superior competence under pressure were all but demolished. Thereafter Kennedy surged ahead of Nixon in the opinion polls, although the Vice-President, with the assistance of the ever-popular “Ike,” recovered much of the lost ground in the closing phases of the contest.

One other development during the fall campaign assumed special significance, for it helped swing to Kennedy’s side a crucial bloc of votes. In the middle of October, the Reverend Martin Luther King, who had assumed leadership of the southern Negroes’ civil rights protest movement, was jailed for participation in an Atlanta sit-in demonstration. In an impulsive gesture of support for the imprisoned Negro spokesman, whose non-violent methods had won endorsement in the Democratic platform, Kennedy telephoned the minister’s wife and indicated his deep interest in the case. The Democratic candidate’s move received wide publicity among Negroes, and helped win many of them away from the Republican affinity that had redeveloped during the Eisenhower years. On the other hand Nixon, still hoping perhaps to

woo the votes of southern whites, let King's predicament pass by without comment.

On election day, the Democratic national ticket won overwhelming endorsement among America's Negroes, as it did among the country's Catholics and Jews. This support was essential in enabling Kennedy to carry the populous industrial states in the Northeast. Their electoral votes, joined with those of the southern states—largely retained in the Democratic column through the efforts of Lyndon Johnson—provided the party with its margin of victory. While Kennedy received only one-fifth of one per cent more of the popular vote than Nixon, its strategic distribution provided him with a lead of 303 to 219 in the Electoral College.

Yet the renewed support for their ticket among ethnic minorities did not in itself account for the Democrats' triumph. Considerably more than half of Kennedy's votes came from native white Protestants, a fact which indicated that the cause of cultural pluralism had made impressive inroads into the cult of narrow "100 per cent Americanism" in the years since 1928. Moreover, given the "activist" nature of the campaigns waged by both candidates—and particularly by the winner—it was entirely plausible to read the returns as indicating that once again, as during the Progressive Era and the New Deal, a majority of citizens wanted a President who would provide vigorous leadership to prosecute the nation's "unfinished business." That, at any rate, was the interpretation the President-elect gave the results in his inaugural address on January 20, 1961, when he urged his fellow citizens to "ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country."

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

The demands for sacrifice presaged in the new President's inaugural speech were not long in materializing. During the summer of 1961, draft calls increased and thousands of reservists were called to active duty as Kennedy ordered a limited mobilization in response to Soviet Premier Khrushchev's re-

newed threat to turn the West's status in Berlin over to the hostile East German Communist regime. On the other side of the globe, meanwhile, strong containment action seemed necessary to help the friendly South Vietnam Republic withstand Vietcong guerrilla infiltration from the Communist North. In the fall of 1961, the United States began to supplement its material assistance to South Vietnam with American military personnel who were to instruct native troops in tactics and weaponry.

THE CUBAN CRISIS

But neither Berlin nor Vietnam provided the thorniest problem for the Kennedy administration; rather it was the presence of a hostile regime on an island only 90 miles removed from America's shores. Even before he took office, Kennedy was informed of plans that the Eisenhower administration had under way for an invasion of the island by a force of Cuban exiles who had fled Castro's Cuba. Events were to show that the project was poorly conceived; nevertheless, the daring of the scheme appealed to the new President, and he gave it his endorsement. However, he also destroyed whatever slight chance it had for success by vetoing its plan for United States Air Force cover for the invaders. When the "army of liberation" landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961, the operation quickly degenerated into a total fiasco.

At the least, as an embarrassing international blunder, the Cuban invasion matched the U-2 incident. Yet the Kennedy government learned important lessons from the venture. It reimpressed the President with the need for readiness to commit American military power once cold calculation had dictated a policy to be pursued. That valuable instruction was not lost on the White House when, in October of 1962, developments in Cuba brought another confrontation not only with Castro, but also with Moscow.

On the evening of October 22, President Kennedy revealed to a startled world that the Soviet Union was constructing offensive missile bases in Cuba which would be cap-

able of raining nuclear destruction on a large part of the United States. Insisting upon prompt dismantling of the sites, the President announced establishment of a naval blockade of the island to turn back ships carrying military cargo to its shores. Russian ships on route to Cuba altered their course and four days later the Soviet Premier acceded to Kennedy's demands that the missile bases be dismantled.

The President's firmness and decisive action during the Cuban confrontation, as in the Berlin crisis a year earlier, had a tonic effect in building respect for the United States in capitals both friendly and antagonistic. Moscow learned that the new Administration was prepared to meet Communist challenges firmly with a variety of responses—limited or massive, conventional or nuclear, as the case might require. Apparently, the lesson was taken to heart, and after October of 1962 another softening of Russian attitudes became noticeable.

THE MIDTERM ELECTION

The Cuban crisis produced important results in the United States, too, where during its first two years in office the Administration had been besieged by charges that its policies were negative, and too temporizing with the Communists in Berlin, Southeast Asia, Cuba, and elsewhere. The government, right-wing spokesmen asserted, was overly subservient to its allies and to world opinion" and was pursuing a "no win" course. Yet Khrushchev's backdown in October, 1962, represented a clear-cut victory for Americans in the "long twilight struggle" with communism that Kennedy asked them to endure. In its aftermath there was widespread agreement that, except for the Bay of Pigs disaster, the young Chief Executive had proven himself a capable leader in meeting the challenges of the New Frontier abroad, and that judgment influenced America's voters when they went to the polls in November. Contrary to the midterm tradition, the incumbent party actually increased its majority in the Senate, while suffering a loss of only two seats in the House.

During Kennedy's tenure in the White House, Congress was amenable to following where the President wished to lead in the fields of foreign policy and defense. Law-makers voted the money he requested to refurbish the nation's conventional armed forces. They authorized huge new appropriations for an accelerated space program. Despite continued grumbling against foreign aid expenditures, the Administration also succeeded in launching new programs of assistance such as the "Alliance for Progress" effort in Latin America. And the enthusiasm that soon greeted the Peace Corps shocked veteran observers of Capitol Hill.

Nevertheless, the old coalition of conservative Republicans and Democrats continued to wield considerable influence in Congress, and New Frontiersmen consequently encountered difficulty in their efforts to exert more federal power at home as well as abroad. By executive action the Administration sought to curb the recurrent economic recession that marked the closing years of the Eisenhower regime. But recovery was sluggish, the nation's growth rate remained low, and a naggingly high rate of unemployment constituted a drag on the economy. To offset these conditions the President recommended to Congress in 1963 a plan for substantial reductions in corporate and personal income taxes, in the hope that a wave of business investment and consumer purchasing might provide a vital thrust to the whole economy. As might be expected, Kennedy's proposal deliberately to unbalance the budget ran into stiff opposition. In the fall his tax bill still languished in congressional committees, as Administration spokesmen sought to overcome traditional sentiments which Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism had done much to reinforce.

In the festering realm of civil rights, the President and Attorney General Robert Kennedy employed vigorous executive action to lend support to the Negroes' cause. When repression of Negro protest demonstrations assumed extremely violent forms during the spring of 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama, and elsewhere, President Kennedy concluded that

Congress, too, must act upon what was swiftly becoming the main domestic issue facing the American people. In June, he called for passage of the most sweeping civil rights bill in modern history. During August, a mammoth throng participated in an orderly and solemnly impressive "March on Washington" to petition for the bill's approval. By fall, however, its fate still hung in doubt, as southern senators prepared to wage a last-ditch battle against the measure.

By that time, moreover, New Frontiersmen had achieved only a spotty record in Congress in their determination to move the country beyond the boundaries set by the New Deal and "modern Republicanism" in the field of social legislation. Once again, the lawmakers proved willing to expand old-established programs in social security, public housing and minimum wage regulation. But the Kennedy administration, like Truman's, suffered stinging defeats when it tried to make medical care for the aged a part of the social security system, and to launch a large-scale program of federal aid to public education.

The prospects for Kennedy's reelection in 1964 appeared favorable, however, as the political season reopened late in 1963. The thaw in the cold war had persisted, giving rise to negotiation of a limited nuclear test-ban treaty which Congress ratified in August. The religious factor no longer seemed to affect people's attitudes toward the President, and opinion polls indicated that even a substantial number of Republicans were satisfied. New Frontiersmen therefore looked forward with anticipation to the first two years of what they confidently expected would be Kennedy's second term in office. Then, armed with a more impressive mandate than his slim victory of 1960 had afforded, the President might yet prove successful in shaking Congress from its lethargy and in getting the country "moving again."

But John Kennedy's fight for reelection was not to be. Shortly after noon on Friday, November 22, three shots rang out as a motorcade passed through downtown Dallas, Texas. One of them wounded Texas Gov-

ernor John Connally; the other two killed the President.

The man who succeeded Kennedy as President, Lyndon B. Johnson, promised to carry on the spirit and program of his predecessor. During his first ten months as chief executive, Johnson met with considerable success in prosecuting certain of the foreign and defense policies which he had inherited. In 1964, Congress seemed more willing than before to give the White House its way in foreign aid matters. New landmarks were achieved in the realm of space exploration. The President was explicit in keeping the world informed of advances in America's purely military capacities.

In Southeast Asia, the government was compelled to step up its direct military action. During 1964, Communist guerrillas quickened the pace of their aggression in Vietnam; in July, therefore, Johnson committed an even larger American force to South Vietnam in order to hold the containment line in that part of the world. And when Soviet-built North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked American destroyers early in August, Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes against the boats' bases.

In other respects, however, the thaw that marked American-Soviet relations in 1963 continued. Consequently, the international scene remained relatively trouble-free—a condition which the President could count an asset as he faced election on his own merits in the fall.

The most striking developments of Johnson's first months in the White House, however, took place in the field of domestic legislation. In dealing with Congress the President benefitted from the sympathetic attitude that greets any new chief executive, and particularly one who assumes office under such tragic circumstances. In addition, Johnson brought important attributes of his own to the task. He had served in Congress for nearly three decades; as Majority Leader of the Senate during the Eisenhower years he enjoyed immense popularity and demonstrated unusual abilities in guiding legislation to enactment. Moreover, as a southerner,

Johnson commanded the respect of the Dixie contingent in Congress to a greater degree than most of his recent predecessors. Finally, it appeared that Johnson's simple, even "homely," airs perhaps carried greater appeal to many congressmen than had the intellectualized and "academic" aura that pervaded the Kennedy administration.

Under this favorable set of circumstances, much of the program of domestic legislation that Kennedy formulated before his death became law during 1964. In February, Congress approved the tax-cut measure; in June, despite the longest filibuster in history, it completed action on the epochal Civil Rights Act. The lawmakers also approved an Administration-sponsored farm program, a Mass Transportation Act, Social Security benefit improvements, and a "wilderness" conservation bill that had been stalled for nine years.

THE 1964 CAMPAIGN

That President Johnson intended to move beyond the bounds of Kennedy's program became evident in 1964 when the President submitted, and Congress passed, a far-reaching "War on Poverty" bill. Declaring as his objective "the Great Society" for Americans of all conditions and creeds and colors, Johnson made clear his intention to exert even greater federal effort in the attempt to erase conditions that blight American liberty and affluence. Achievement of the President's ambition became the theme of the Democratic National Convention that nominated him on August 26. As his running mate, Johnson designated Senator Hubert Humphrey from Minnesota—an outspoken liberal whose devotion to the principles of the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and "the Great Society" was undoubted.

Meanwhile, a drastic shift had taken place in the leadership and orientation of the Republican party. Ever since the Nixon-Rockefeller "deal" of 1960, Arizona's Senator Barry Goldwater had entertained thoughts of challenging the hold so long maintained by the "liberal, internationalist, eastern Establishment" within the GOP. Long before the party's 1964 nominating convention, Gold-

water devotees were hard at work rounding up delegate strength for their idol. Their task was made easier by indolence of the "modern Republicans" in the face of what seemed like a probable Democratic victory, and by the Establishment's self-assurance that in no case could the conservatives usurp control of the party.

By the time the San Francisco convention met in July, however, the Goldwaterites were in firm command. They easily withstood the last-minute effort by some moderates to rally support behind the belated candidacy of Governor William Scranton of Pennsylvania. With equal facility they beat back the moderates' attempts to add to the party platform a stronger civil rights plank, a plank reaffirming exclusive presidential control over use of the nation's nuclear arsenal, and a statement condemning Communists, the John Birch Society, and other "extremist" groups.

Nor did the Senator himself offer his opponents any quarter during his hour of triumph. In his speech accepting nomination he seemed to taunt them with the assertion that "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! . . . moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!" As his partner on the ticket Goldwater selected William Miller of New York, a congressman who shared his views.

The man who now promised to offer the electorate "a choice, not an echo" had once denounced the Eisenhower administration as "a dime-store New Deal"; on occasion he had suggested repealing the progressive income tax, selling TVA, and putting the social security system on a voluntary basis; he voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964—one of six Republican senators to do so—on constitutional grounds.

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J. Joseph Huthmacher is the author of *Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919-1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). His articles and reviews have appeared in several of the historical journals and he is currently at work on a biography of the late New York senator, Robert F. Wagner.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Democratic and Republican Platform Planks

The planks of the Democratic and Republican party platforms adopted at their national conventions provide a basis for comparison of the two parties on vital issues. These excerpts are taken from the platforms adopted by the Republican National Convention in San Francisco on July 15, 1964, and by the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City on August 25, 1964.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

HUMAN RIGHTS

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 deserves and requires full observance by every American and fair, effective enforcement if there is any default.

Resting upon a national consensus expressed by the overwhelming support of both parties, this new law impairs the rights of no American: it affirms the rights of all Americans. Its purpose is not to divide, but to end division; not to curtail the opportunities of any, but to increase opportunities for all; not to punish, but to promote further our commitment to freedom, the pursuit of justice, and a deeper respect for human dignity. . . .

The immigration laws must be revised to permit families to be reunited, to welcome the persecuted and oppressed, and to eliminate the discriminatory provisions which base admission upon national origin.

We will support legislation to carry forward the progress already made toward full equality of opportunity for women as well as men. . . .

ON POVERTY

Ending discrimination based on race, age, sex, or national origin demands not only equal opportunity but the opportunity to be equal. We are concerned not only with

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

HUMAN RIGHTS

[We pledge:]

Full implementation and faithful execution of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and all other civil rights statutes to assure equal rights and opportunities guaranteed by the Constitution to every citizen;

Improvements of civil rights statutes adequate to changing needs of our times;

Such additional administrative or legislative actions as may be required to end the denial, for whatever unlawful reason, of the right to vote;

Immigration legislation seeking to reunite families and continuation of the "fair-share" refugee program;

Continued opposition to discrimination based on race, creed, national origin, or sex. We recognize that the elimination of any such discrimination is a matter of heart, conscience, and education as well as of equal rights under the law.

ON POVERTY

This Administration has refused to take practical free enterprise measures to help the poor. Under the last Republican Administration, the percentage of poor in the country dropped encouragingly from 28 per cent to 21 per cent. By contrast, the present Administration, despite a massive increase in

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

people's right to be free, but also with their ability to use their freedom.

We will:—Carry the war on poverty forward as a total war against the causes of human want. . . .

The Social Security program, initiated and developed under the national leadership of the Democratic party and in the face of ceaseless partisan opposition, contributes greatly to the strength of the nation. We must ensure that those who have contributed to the system shall share in the steady increase in our standard of living by adjusting benefit levels. . . .

FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

It is the national purpose, and our commitment, to continue this expansion of the American economy toward its potential, without a recession, with continued stability, and with an extension of the benefits of this growth and prosperity to those who have not fully shared in them.

This will require continuation of flexible and innovative fiscal, monetary, and debt-management policies, recognizing the importance of low interest rates.

We will seek further reduction—and in the process we need to remove inequities in our present tax laws. In particular we should carefully review all our excise taxes and eliminate those that are obsolete. Consideration should be given to the development of fiscal policies which would provide revenue sources to hardpressed state and local governments to assist them with their responsibilities.

Every penny of Federal spending must be accounted for in terms of the strictest economy, efficiency and integrity. We pledge to continue a frugal government, getting a dollar's value for a dollar spent, and a government worthy of the citizen's confidence. Our goal is a balanced budget in a balanced economy.

Our enviable record of price stability must be maintained—through sound fiscal and monetary policies and the encouragement of responsible private wage and price policies.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

the Federal bureaucracy, has managed a mere two-percentage-point reduction.

This Administration has proposed a so-called war on poverty which characteristically overlaps, and often contradicts, the 42 existing Federal poverty programs. It would dangerously centralize Federal controls and bypass effective state, local and private programs. . . .

We pledge:

Revision of the Social Security laws to allow higher earnings without loss of benefits, by our elderly people; full coverage of all medical and hospital costs of needy elder people financed by general revenues through broader implementation of Federal-state plans, rather than the compulsory Democratic scheme covering only a small percentage of such costs, for everyone regardless of need.

FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

We Republicans shall vigorously protect the dynamo of economic growth—free, competitive enterprise—that has made America the envy of the world. For instance, we pledge:

Removal of the wartime Federal excise taxes favored by the Democratic Administration on pens, pencils, jewelry, cosmetics, luggage, hand-bags, wallets and toiletries;

Assistance to small business by simplifying Federal and state tax and regulatory requirements, fostering the availability of longer-term credit at fair terms and equity capital for small firms, encouraging strong state programs to foster small business, establishing more effective measures to assure a sharing of small business in Federal procurement, and promoting wider export opportunities;

An end to power-grabbing regulatory actions, such as the reach by the Federal Trade Commission for injunctive powers and the ceaseless pressing by the White House, the Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission to dominate consumer decisions in the market place;

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

Stability is essential to protect our citizens—particularly the retired and handicapped—from the ravages of inflation. It is also essential to maintain confidence in the American dollar; this confidence has been restored in the past four years through sound policies. . . .

Full employment is an end in itself and must be insisted upon as a priority objective. . . .

ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Each level of government has appropriate powers and each has specific responsibilities. The first responsibility of government at every level is to protect the basic freedoms of the people. No government at any level can properly complain of violation of its powers, if it fails to meet its responsibilities.

The Federal Government exists not to grow larger, but to enlarge the individual potential and achievement of the people.

The Federal Government exists not to subordinate the states, but to support them. . . .

EXTREMISM

We condemn extremism, whether from the right or left, including the extreme tactics of such organizations as the Communist party, the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society. . . .

ARMS CONTROL

As citizens of the United States, we are determined that it be the most powerful nation on earth. . . .

In the nuclear test ban treaty, signed now by over 100 nations, we have written our commitment to limitations on the arms race, consistent with our security. Reduced production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes has been announced and nuclear weapons [are] barred from outer space. . . .

We are determined to continue all-out effort through fully enforceable measures to halt and reverse the arms race and bring to an end the era of nuclear terror.

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REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

Returning the consumer to the driver's seat as the chief regulator and chief beneficiary of a free economy, by resisting excessive concentration of power, whether public or private;

A drastic reduction in burdensome Federal paper work and overlapping regulations which weigh heavily on small-business men struggling to compete and to provide jobs. . . .

ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Within our Republic the Federal Government should act only in areas where it has constitutional authority to act, and then only in respect to proven needs where individuals and local or state governments will not or cannot adequately perform. Great power, whether governmental or private, political or economic, must be so checked, balanced and restrained and, where necessary, so dispersed as to prevent it from becoming a threat to freedom any place in the land.

PUBLIC PRAYER

[We pledge:]

Support of a constitutional amendment permitting those individuals and groups who choose to do so to exercise their religion freely in public places, provided religious exercises are not prepared or prescribed by the state or political subdivision thereof and no person's participation therein is coerced, thus preserving the traditional separation of church and state.

ARMS CONTROL

Republicans pledge to keep the nation's sword sharp, ready, and dependable.

We will maintain a superior, not merely equal, military capability as long as the Communist drive for world domination continues. It will be a capability of balanced force, superior in all its arms, maintaining flexibility for effective performance in the rapidly changing science of war.

Republicans will never unilaterally disarm America.

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BOOK REVIEWS

American Politics at Work

A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. BY BROADUS MITCHELL AND LOUISE MITCHELL. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 384 pages, bibliography, appendix, and index, \$6.75.)

This survey of American constitutional history may be of some limited use as a textbook. It covers material from the Articles of Confederation to *Brown v. Board of Education* and *Baker v. Carr*. Most attention is given to the formation of the Constitution and its ratification, including biographical sketches of the principals. It is highly selective, brief, and unencumbered by footnotes, citations, or bibliographical reference.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL POLITICS. BY AARON B. WILDAVSKY AND NELSON W. POLSBY. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. 218 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$3.95.)

In many fields, recent research findings take some years to filter down to the textbook stage. Here in simple, straightforward language, two political scientists have provided undergraduate instructors and interested laymen with contemporary political science data within a sophisticated framework. The categories of influence relevant to presidential politics are set forth with careful attention both to canons of evidence and opportunities for generalization.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 1854-1964. BY GEORGE H. MAYER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 563 pages, notes and index, \$9.75.)

Histories of American political parties

are histories of elections. The history of the Republican party, to a great extent, is the history of the Civil War and its immediate aftermath. This timely book fits this pattern. It is not a definitive study of the Republican party. It is, rather, a well-written description of some of the major national political events of a century of American history viewed from the perspective of the dominant political party. After the shift of popular support to the Democrats, the story of the Republicans is described as one of search and frustration, relieved only briefly by the advent of "New Republicans."

JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE. BY LEONARD W. LEVY. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963. 225 pages, bibliography, notes, and index, \$4.50.)

Placing historical figures in categories, such as "libertarian," perhaps does more to exclude evidence than to explain men. Levy states that the purpose of this book is to examine the validity of Jefferson's "historical reputation as an apostle of liberty." The evidence in this reevaluation of Jefferson reveals a most inconsistent libertarian on such matters as loyalty oaths, bills of attainder, and treasonous speech. These inconsistencies, Levy argues, cannot be explained by different definitions or contexts of libertarian positions but rather by the personality and changing political roles of a man of strong preferences.

HAYES: THE DIARY OF A PRESIDENT, 1875-1881. EDITED BY T. HARRY WILLIAMS. (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1964. 329 pages, introduction, chronology, and index, \$6.50.)

Hayes is one of three presidents who kept diaries during their tenure in office. These

presidential diaries provide some of the most important data on this one-man institution. Included are a brief introduction to Hayes the man, a chronology of major events during his political life, and a sketch of some of the major people mentioned in the diaries. This collection covers the period from Hayes' nomination for a third term as governor to his departure from Washington.

McKINLEY, BRYAN, AND THE PEOPLE.

By PAUL W. GLAD. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964. 222 pages, bibliographical essay and index, \$3.95.)

This study, one in a series of books on "Critical Periods in History," details some of the well-known events and issues surrounding one of America's most colorful elections. Because the 1896 election was one of those relatively infrequent occasions of clearly defined issues and personalities, it provides interesting data on the American political tradition. Glad describes the sources of support for the parties and candidates and then turns to voting results in an attempt to discover the popular support for a regionally based party leadership with aspirations for legitimacy as a national power.

THE TRUMAN COMMITTEE: A STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. By DONALD H. RIDDLE. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964. 207 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

A careful accounting of the seven-year record of a "responsible" and "successful" congressional investigating committee is provided as a counterbalance to the literature prompted by the notoriety of congressional abuses. General criteria are offered for defining a "responsible" committee. Although these criteria are seldom explicitly utilized, it is clear that the Truman committee not only met them, but also functioned well as an overseer of that vast quantity of activity required by modern war.

WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED. THE LAST YEARS OF WOODROW WILSON. By GENE SMITH. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1964. 307 pages, bibliography, notes and index, \$5.95.)

The personal incidents surrounding Wilson's last days as a President and as a man delineate the tragic dimensions of opportunity lost because of institutional weakness. The second Mrs. Wilson's role is given some attention, but she remains a secondary figure. This is an inside view. The consequences of Wilson's incapacity outside the bedroom circle of advisers, friends and officials are not emphasized in this personalized review.

THE NEW DEAL AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. Edited by FRANK FREIDEL. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. 151 pages, \$1.95.)

What was the impact of the New Deal on the common man? To answer this question, Frank Freidel selected 18 excerpts from magazines, periodicals, and books of the 1930's. With a minimum of commentary, the author has packaged in this collection some glimpses into what he calls the "human side" of various New Deal programs.

OBSTACLE COURSE ON CAPITOL HILL. By ROBERT BENDINER. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964. 231 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.95.)

Federal aid to education is the issue of discussion in this straightforward critique of Congress by a journalist. Again, as with many critical statements on Congress, obvious points of controversy, such as the committee system, are covered but not explained. Again, it is difficult to distinguish between an ineffective legislative body and a Congress that does not produce desired legislation. The reader has four citations in the footnotes and a very brief bibliography with which to judge the extent to which Bendiner's opinions are shared by students of Congress.

DECISION-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE OLIVE BRANCH OR THE ARROWS. By THEODORE C. SORENSEN. Introduction by John F. Kennedy. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. 94 pages and index, \$3.50.)

In these Columbia University lectures, an adviser to the late President Kennedy attempts the difficult task of distinguishing between rationalizations and facts of presidential action. Although Sorensen's experiences were confined to the Kennedy administration, he draws on a wide scope of historical evidence, particularly that written by his colleague, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. The Cuban crisis serves as a frequent example of the process of decision. Sorensen, in spite of close identification with the policies he describes, made a sincere effort objectively to state the conditions, the characteristics, and the limitations of presidential decision.

FROM THE NEW FREEDOM TO THE NEW FRONTIER: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1912 TO THE PRESENT. By ANDRÉ MAUROS. Translated by Patrick O'Brien. (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963. 365 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

Many of America's trans-Atlantic mirrors are bent with age. André Maurois, who spent some time in the United States at various periods, has written an account of a long period in American history. This book, however, should have a high degree of reader interest not because of the history, but rather because of the French author's comments and observations about Americans and America.

In the last chapter, "The United States in 1960," Maurois frees himself of the historical narrative and generalizes about American culture, politics, education and character. Although some of his statements seem strange, some facts wrong, many explanations over-simplified, and a few sentences clumsy, this book will absorb the reader in speculation about the impact

these assertions may have on interested European audiences.

LYNDON JOHNSON: A BIOGRAPHY. By HARRY PROVENCE. (New York: Fleet Publishing Corporation, 1964. 192 pages and index, \$4.50.)

A Texas newspaper editor has written this campaign biography in the familiar format. Johnson's biography, however, has overtones of being of greater import than that of a presidential biography alone. It conveys to the reader the feeling that Johnson's life is the biography of the professional politician.

BARRY GOLDWATER. PORTRAIT OF AN ARIZONAN. By EDWIN McDOWELL. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964. 269 pages, photographs and index, \$4.95.)

Campaign biographies are often written for the undecided but consumed by the partisan. The biography deals with an interesting but difficult subject. Goldwater's pioneer, western background is emphasized and his strong positions on labor unions, the progressive income tax, and civil rights are tempered with explanations.

Dr. Henry Teune
University of Pennsylvania

THE PRESIDENCY: A SPECIAL ISSUE. Edited by American Heritage. (New York: American Heritage Publishing Company, August, 1964. 112 pages, 15 articles and bibliography, \$3.95.)

This is an intriguing and absorbing collection of fact, figures and some fancy about the American presidency. Photographs, reproductions and cartoons richly illustrate many facets of this great and enduring office.

To single out but two of the well-assorted articles, E. M. Halliday spotlights the role that the American military man has played as a President and as a candidate, while Bruce Catton outlines how different Presidents have met the difficult task of decision-making. T.H.B.

THE FIRST HALF-CENTURY

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and fraud and violence in Kansas made "Bleeding Kansas" the new party's favorite issue in 1856.

Its candidate, John C. Fremont, was a former Democrat of discreet antislavery feelings, and acceptable to the several power centers of the party. For the vice-presidency, William L. Dayton, a former Whig senator of New Jersey, was chosen over Abraham Lincoln of Illinois.

The Democratic nominee, James Buchanan, from the important state of Pennsylvania, possessed a long record of inoffensive conservatism and had never offended the South. John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, a friend of Stephen A. Douglas who had competed with Buchanan for the presidential nomination, was named the vice-presidential candidate.

In 1856, the Democrats, the party of union, fought hard against the Republicans, the party of sectionalism. Republican success depended on victories in Illinois, Indiana and Pennsylvania. But in these border free states, the antislavery crusade backfired because of anxiety over Republican radicalism, and the Democrat, James Buchanan, triumphed. It was not yet clear in 1856 whether the nation's political parties could guide it over the shoals of the slavery issue, or whether the union would dissolve in fratricidal strife.

THE ELECTION OF 1916

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By narrow margins Wilson lost four states west of the Mississippi—Minnesota, South Dakota, Iowa and Oregon.

The labor vote in Ohio, the vote of women (Wilson carried nine of the eleven states having women suffrage) and of German-Americans especially anxious to avoid war, progressives attracted both by Wilson's domestic program and to his hopes for peace, when added

to the regular Democratic votes in key states, probably were enough, with the "solid" South, to put Wilson over. Wilson won a clear-cut victory in the popular vote, 9,126,606 to 8,538,221, but he still was a "minority President," for Socialists and Prohibitionists polled a total of over 800,000 votes. The electoral vote was 277 to 254 (Wilson picked up one electoral vote in West Virginia, though Hughes carried the state).

Wilson's triumph in 1916 may have had far-reaching consequences for political alignment in this country. The nation's endorsement of his brand of progressivism—embodying as it did much of Theodore Roosevelt's "New Nationalism"—may have strengthened the progressive elements in the Democratic party for the next generation. One student of American politics, Jesse Macy, expressed the opinion in 1912 that there should come out of the situation then developing

a real conservative party and a real liberal party, and that the Democrats, having stood the test of time and being conservative in habits and instincts, are the best nucleus for the conservative party, and that out of the Republican party is to come the radical party of the future, which is to prove itself less bound by constitutional restraints, and more in touch with the problems of social justice and the poor.

Agreeing with this view, James A. Woodburn predicted that the Democratic party would prove too conservative for the Wilson-Bryan program and would probably split.

POLITICS OF THE 1920'S

(Continued from page 215)

usual. This anticipated a voting behavior which would widen with Franklin D. Roosevelt and continue to this day. Smith carried Rhode Island and Massachusetts, where the religious issue operated in reverse.

When Hoover was inaugurated President in 1929 the bull market was still in full swing. About seven months later came the stock market crash, which finished the lush prosperity of the 1920's. Thereafter, President Hoover was to spend the rest of his administration battling the Great Depression.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

(Continued from page 204)

take a position in advance of the President.

The Republican party's incapacity to become an enduring agency of enlightened government was amply demonstrated by the term of William Howard Taft (1909-1912). Taft was actually a moderate progressive; but circumstances forced him to align himself with the Old Guard at the outset of his term, and ineptitude and a distaste for strong leadership constrained him to continue the alignment thereafter. The fundamental cleavage within the party was consequently brought into the open; hundreds of thousands of progressive, middle-class Republicans were alienated; and enormous pressures were exerted first on La Follette, then on Roosevelt, to oppose the President for the nomination in 1912.

There is no doubt that Roosevelt's strident egotism figured prominently in his decision to fight Taft and then to organize the "Bull Moose" party in the summer of 1912. But it bears emphasizing that the underlying issue was the Old Guard's resistance to social and economic change. The progressive Republicans were determined to have a progressive candidate, and if Roosevelt had not led them out of the G. O. P., La Follette probably would have.

ROLE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The most notable feature of the campaign that followed was Wilson's and Roosevelt's forthright discussion of the most fundamental issue of twentieth century domestic politics—the role of the federal government in American life. Wilson sincerely avowed a concern for social justice. But his "New Freedom" was more redolent of Manchester liberalism and the southern conception of states' rights than of the advanced social thought of the times. He accordingly held that federal intervention should be kept to a minimum once competition was restored by the reduction of the tariff and the destruction of the trusts.

Conversely, Roosevelt's "New National-

ism," a mature version of the program he had set forth piece-meal when President, called for continuous federal action on a wide variety of fronts. "We propose," he thundered, "to use the whole power of the government to protect all those who, under Mr. Wilson's laissez-faire system, are trodden down in the ferocious, scrambling rush of an unregulated and purely individualistic industrialism." Although Wilson was hurt by Roosevelt's blows, he held in the main to his belief that the trusts should be dissolved and that minimum wages, child labor and other progressive measures should be left to the states.

As President, Wilson soon wrote the burden of his New Freedom into law in one of the most masterful demonstrations of executive leadership in the nation's history. The powerful progressive groundswell continued to rise, however; and late in his first administration Wilson was compelled to ride it. In the culminating irony of the entire period, he and the Democratic majority in Congress pushed through much of the progressive program that Roosevelt had vainly urged upon the Republicans, that Wilson himself had opposed, and that had split asunder the party of Lincoln in 1912.

THE DEMOCRATIC TRIUMPH

(Continued from page 220)

Byrnes was shelved. At the last moment, the delegates received word from Roosevelt that Harry S. Truman of Missouri would be acceptable. A Senator since 1935, Truman was largely unknown until the war. Nonetheless, as chairman of a Senate committee investigating war contracts, he had gained the respect of his colleagues. Also, as a border stater, he was expected to add needed strength to the ticket. The dumping of Byrnes, and the nomination of Truman, indicated once again the strength of the labor and urban elements in the Roosevelt electoral coalition.

Dewey, like Willkie before him, waged a vigorous, able campaign stressing the internationalism of his backers and not only ac-

cepting much of the New Deal domestic program but suggesting he could surpass it. His speeches provided renewed evidence of the striking change in the G.O.P. since the days of Hoover.

In contrast, Roosevelt at first seemed old and tired. Returning from an inspection trip to Hawaii, he spoke aboard ship in the state of Washington, and with the deck slanted precariously and the wind ruffling his manuscript, he stumbled and stammered like a man aged far beyond his 62 years. Yet his love of the campaign trail soon returned; by election day he had shown sufficient vigor to convince voters of his good health.

The result was a fourth electoral triumph, though it was the closest of his presidential career. In a total vote slightly reduced due to the war, F.D.R. garnered 25,600,000 ballots to Dewey's 22,000,000 and captured the Electoral College, 432-99. His percentage of the total vote was 53.39, compared to 54.69 in 1940. As he had since 1936, Roosevelt swept the West, Middle Atlantic and South; as in 1940, he lost northern New England and some of the farm vote in the Midwest and Great Plains. The northern urban vote proved essential; indeed, had 303,193 votes swung to Dewey, especially in the key northern urban areas, Roosevelt would have lost in the Electoral College.

THE ROOSEVELT LEGACY

Whereas a strong President like Theodore Roosevelt and a popular President like Eisenhower have contributed relatively little of lasting impact either upon Republican party philosophy or upon the strength of its organizations, Franklin Roosevelt's tenure markedly altered both for his own party. Assuming office at a time when even he was talking in conservative terms, he left it twelve years later in such a fashion that no presidential candidate through 1960 dared oppose the outlines either of the domestic New Deal or of an internationalist foreign policy.

These developments, given the depression and the war, were perhaps inevitable; even a man less flexible than F.D.R. might have

been forced to adopt new policies to keep pace with the times. But the awakening of the forgotten voter and his adherence to the Democratic party were directly the result of Roosevelt's appeal. Accordingly, the years from 1932 through 1944 not only witnessed the emergence—for the first time since the Civil War—of a majority Democratic party, but of a voting pattern more closely resembling class balloting than at any time in American history. In the presidential elections since the New Deal era, these pivotal changes have had to be recognized by all major candidates. The legacy of the New Deal years has been lasting indeed.

The 1960's

(Continued from page 235)

In the field of foreign affairs, Goldwater had spoken often for those who considered the Democrats' containment policies—which also became the Eisenhower administration's policies after it abandoned "liberation"—an example of softness towards communism. At times the Arizonan had advocated American withdrawal from the United Nations, and the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He seemed to entertain little hope of reaching any sort of accommodation with Moscow, and he voted against the limited test-ban treaty in 1963. Goldwater criticized the alleged timidity of the Administration's actions respecting Southeast Asia and Cuba; he had suggested using tactical nuclear weapons as the means for ending the Vietnamese war. In words reminiscent of General Douglas MacArthur's, the Goldwater-inspired Republican platform of 1964 spoke in terms of attaining "victory" over communism, in contrast to the policy of "measured responses" endorsed by the Johnson administration and its predecessors.

As the campaign got under way, the Senator sought to moderate some of his more outspoken earlier stands. Yet it was evident that Goldwater's candidacy appealed most strongly to those Americans who were deeply discontented with the stresses produced by

their nation's recent history: with the drawn-out, costly demands of the cold war; with the complexities of an industrial, urban society and with the large and expensive role that government had assumed in efforts to resolve them; with the objectives and pace of the Negroes' civil rights movement. In contrast to the Johnson administration, which cautioned moderation in the use of national power abroad while urging more forceful exertion of federal power to solve domestic problems, Goldwater called for restraining federal power at home at the same time that he demanded more ambitious flexing of the nation's strength in its foreign relations. Johnson supporters considered the Republican's formula contradictory and unrealistic, but Goldwaterites felt it would restore to the American system a proper emphasis—one that had been eroded in the wearing away of the nation's traditional ideals.

Thus the Johnson-Goldwater contest afforded Americans the first real opportunity in a generation to approve or reject what had become the main currents of the times: the trend toward measured deliberateness, or "realism" in foreign policy that dated back to the Truman administration; the renewed trend toward employing governmental power to enforce equality of status for minority groups, which dated back to Franklin Roosevelt's time; and the trend toward a more socially-conscious economic system, that dated back to the Progressive Era.

How many Americans wished those trends to continue, and how many desired to attempt to reverse the current, only the election returns of 1964 would reveal.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

(Continued from page 238)

UNITED NATIONS

We will maintain our solemn commitment to the United Nations, with its constituent agencies, working to strengthen it as a more effective instrument for peace, for preventing or resolving international disputes, and for

building free nations through economic, technical, and cultural development. We continue to oppose the admission of Red China to the United Nations.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

(Continued from page 238)

We will demand that any arms-reduction plan worthy of consideration guarantee reliable inspection. We will demand that any such plan assure this nation of sufficient strength, step by step, to forestall and defend against possible violations. . . .

We will fully implement such safeguards as our security requires under the limited nuclear-test-ban treaty. We will conduct advanced tests in permissible areas, maintain facilities to test elsewhere in case of violations, and develop to the fullest our ability to detect Communist transgressions. Additionally, we will regularly review the status of nuclear weaponry under the limited nuclear-test-ban to assure this nation's protection. We shall also provide sensible, continuing reviews of the treaty itself. . . .

UNITED NATIONS

Republicans support the United Nations. However, we will never rest in our efforts to revitalize its original purpose.

We will press for a change in the method of voting in the General Assembly and in the specialized agencies that will reflect population disparities among the member states and recognize differing abilities and willingness to meet the obligations of the Charter. We will insist upon General Assembly acceptance of the International Court of Justice Advisory opinion, upholding denial of the votes of member nations which refuse to meet properly levied assessments, so that the United Nations will more accurately reflect the power realities of the world. . . .

Republicans will never surrender to any international group the responsibility of the United States for its sovereignty, its own security, and the leadership of the free world.

Editor's Note: Topic headings and brackets inserted by editors.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of August, 1964, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin

Aug. 13—An hour of silence is called in West Berlin to protest the erection of the Berlin wall 3 years ago.

Disarmament

Aug. 5—In a joint statement issued by the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. to mark the first anniversary of the limited nuclear test ban treaty, the 3 powers pledge to use negotiation to solve international conflicts.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Aug. 1—Manlio Brosio, the new NATO Secretary-General, assumes office.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

Aug. 3—The Mexican government announces that it will not cut ties with Cuba. Last month an O.A.S. conference agreed to impose sanctions and end diplomatic relations with Cuba.

United Nations

(See also *British Commonwealth, Cyprus, and Vietnam*)

Aug. 1—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, who returned from a world tour last night, declares that he found both France and the Soviet Union unwilling to contribute to certain U.N. peace-keeping operations. When the U.N. session opens in November, 1964, the Soviet Union will be more than 2 years in arrears in assessments owed the U.N. Under article 19 of the U.N. Charter, the Soviet Union could lose its voting rights in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union has threatened a walk-out if voting rights are revoked.

Aug. 5—At the Security Council meeting

on the North Vietnamese-U.S. conflict in the Gulf of Tonkin, the U.S. delegate, Adlai Stevenson, declares that the U.S. attack on North Vietnamese PT boats and bases is a "single action" to show U.S. determination to defend Southeast Asia.

Aug. 8—It is reported by Washington officials that the U.S. has urged the withdrawal of voting rights from the Soviet Union unless it pays its debt to the U.N.

ALGERIA

Aug. 25—The National Assembly (Parliament) approves President Ahmed Ben Bella's proposals for the parliamentary election next month. The National Assembly is to be smaller, 138 members instead of 196.

BOLIVIA

Aug. 6—President Victor Paz Estenssoro is sworn in for a new 4-year term.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE Cyprus

Aug. 8—Turkish Air Force jet planes attack 3 areas along Cyprus' northern coast after the encirclement of Turkish Cypriote strongholds along the Mansoura beach-head by Greek Cypriote forces.

An urgent session of the U.N. Security Council is held. (See also *Turkey*.)

Greek Premier George Papandreou appeals to President Makarios to end "military operations."

Aug. 9—Turkish air attacks on Cyprus are renewed. Makarios asks the U.A.R., Syria and the Soviet Union for military aid.

The U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire on the part of Turkey and Cyprus.

U.S. officials disclose that U.S. Pres-

ident Lyndon Johnson has asked Cyprus, Greece and Turkey for a peaceful solution of their conflict.

Turkish sources disclose that Turkey has withdrawn her air units and bases under the NATO command for use against Cyprus if necessary.

Aug. 10—Turkey and Cyprus inform the U.N. Security Council that they accept the U.N. call for a cease-fire.

The cease-fire becomes effective. Incidents continue and Turkish jets strafe the town of Polis. Turkey declares that it reserved the right to reconnaissance flights in agreeing to the cease-fire.

It is reported that yesterday Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev contacted President Makarios telling him that the Cypriote cause has the sympathy of the Soviet people.

Aug. 11—The U.N. Security Council asks that all flights over Cyprus in violation of Cypriote sovereignty be halted. The commander of the U.N. peace force in Cyprus, General K. S. Thimayya, is ordered to increase U.N. forces in the Mansoura-Kokkina area where Turkish Cypriotes have been besieged by Greek Cypriotes.

Aug. 12—Turkish Foreign Minister F. C. Erkin announces that Turkish reconnaissance flights over Cyprus will end.

Aug. 13—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant asks that the nations who have supplied troops for the Cyprus operation send more.

Aug. 18—An agreement is reached by the U.N. and the government of Cyprus to lift the food, fuel and water blockade against Turkish Cypriote areas.

Aug. 19—Greece and Turkey separately announce that military units withdrawn from NATO commands will be returned to the Alliance.

Aug. 20—U Thant declares that unless more money can be raised the U.N. peace force in Cyprus will have to end operations before its mandate expires on September 27.

U.N. troops tear down 3 Turkish Cypriote gun posts along the green truce line in Nicosia.

Aug. 29—The Turkish Foreign Ministry announces that it will postpone rotation of its military forces on Cyprus. The Cypriote government has refused to permit Turk troop rotation; Turkey had threatened to use force if necessary.

India

Aug. 19—The Central Working Committee of the ruling Congress party adopts a resolution thanking the U.S. for agreeing to send 6 million tons of wheat to India; the resolution supports Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's efforts to meet the food shortage.

Aug. 24—It is reported that over 1,100 people in 8 Indian cities have been arrested for participating in a 3-day *satyagraha* (non-violent demonstration) to protest grain shortages and the high prices of grain. The *satyagraha* is sponsored by the pro-Soviet branch of the Indian Communist party.

Aug. 25—It is reported that over 2,500 persons have been arrested on the second day of the *satyagraha*.

Kenya

Aug. 14—Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta announces that Kenya, which became independent in December, 1963, will become a republic in December, 1964; it will remain in the Commonwealth.

Malaysia, Federation of

Aug. 17—The Malaysian Defense Ministry reports that a small group of Indonesians have landed in Malaya.

Aug. 22—An official count discloses that 7 Indonesian members of an approximately 40-man landing force have been killed. Most of the others have been captured.

Uganda

Aug. 24—Prime Minister Milton Obote announces the end of the alliance between his Uganda People's Congress and the Kabaka Yekka party. Two cabinet members belonging to the Kabaka Yekka party are dismissed.

BRITISH TERRITORIES

British Guiana

Aug. 10—Security forces declare that they have discovered a terrorist organization linked to prominent political personalities; they charge that the terrorist group is responsible for the killings and property destruction during the 171-day sugar strike.

Northern Rhodesia

Aug. 3—Members of the fanatical Lumpa sect attack Lundazi, in the eastern sector of Northern Rhodesia, and kill some 150 persons. Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda orders government forces to capture Alice Lenshina, leader of the Lumpas, dead or alive.

Aug. 12—Alice Lenshina, her husband, and 2 of her children are in prison after surrendering to government forces. Prime Minister Kaunda tells the parliament that Lenshina has appealed to her followers to end their fight with the government.

Aug. 25—It is announced that Kaunda has been elected President-Designate of Zambia, the name to be assumed by Northern Rhodesia when it becomes independent on October 24.

Southern Rhodesia

Aug. 11—Prime Minister Ian D. Smith tells parliament that he will fly to Great Britain next month to discuss independence.

Aug. 25—Prime Minister Smith tells the parliament that Southern Rhodesia will unilaterally declare its independence if negotiations with Britain fail.

Aug. 26—The Southern Rhodesian government outlaws the 2 African Nationalist groups, the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Peoples' Caretaker Council. Government forces surround the African township of Highfield, where a 3-month state of emergency is ordered.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Aug. 2—In a note to Moscow, quoted by *Hsinhua* (Communist Chinese press

agency), Communist China urges the Soviet Union not to withdraw as co-chairman of the Geneva conference on Laos.

Aug. 30—The Communist Chinese government, in a letter to the Soviet Union reported by *Hsinhua*, declares that it cannot participate in the "hasty schismatic meeting" called by Moscow for December 15. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Aug. 4—It is reported that members of the rebel "Popular Army" and loyal government forces are fighting in Stanleyville. The "Popular Army" is composed of dissident tribesmen from Maniema Province who oppose their provincial government.

Aug. 5—It is reported that Stanleyville has fallen to the Popular Army.

Aug. 6—The U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, W. Averell Harriman, leaves for Brussels to confer with Belgian leaders on the Congolese situation.

Aug. 7—Harriman and Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak confer for 5 hours. Sources report that an agreement has been reached under which the U.S. will send materiel to the Congo and Belgium will send advisers to teach the Congolese how to use it.

Aug. 8—Harriman returns to the U.S.

Aug. 9—Premier Moïse Tshombe declares that no outside troops are necessary to put down the growing rebellion.

Aug. 11—U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams leaves for the Congo.

Aug. 12—The U.S. Pentagon declares that the U.S. has sent 4 C-130 turboprop transport planes with American crews to the Congo on "temporary assignment for transport function." Some 100 U.S. Army and Air Force personnel, including 40 paratroopers, are also sent to guard and maintain the planes.

Aug. 17—According to informed sources, Tshombe has asked 5 African states to send troops to help end the rebellion.

Aug. 18—The U.N. announces that 2 U.N. officials have been killed by rebels in Kivu Province.

Aug. 23—It is reported in *The New York Times* that South African (white) mercenaries are signing up to fight in the Congo against rebels threatening Tshombe's government. The rebels receive support from leftists in the French Congo and Burundi.

Aug. 24—The official spokesman for Tshombe, Emmanuel Sinda, denies that mercenaries are to be used.

Aug. 25—It is reported from Johannesburg in the Republic of South Africa that a recruiting agent there is signing up mercenaries to fight in the Congo.

Aug. 28—Antoine Gizenga, leftist leader, announces he has formed the United Lumumbist party. He declares Tshombe is not able to negotiate a political settlement to end Congolese difficulties.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Aug. 27—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, on a 10-day visit to participate in the 20th anniversary of the Slovak uprising against the Nazis, criticizes the Chinese Communists for impairing Communist unity.

Aug. 31—At Hradcany Castle, Czech President Antonin Novotny and Premier Khrushchev hold talks. *Ceteka* (official press agency) declares that the talks have revealed unity of views on many matters.

At an evening reception at the castle, the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Polish foreign ministers are among the guests.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Aug. 26—Official sources in Berlin report that the East German government has released many political prisoners, including many West Germans and West Berliners.

HAITI

Aug. 5—The Legislative Assembly votes to grant full powers to President Francois Duvalier, enabling him to rule by decree.

INDONESIA

Aug. 4—British forces kill 4 Indonesian guerrillas in a conflict near the Sarawak border. (See also *British Commonwealth, Malaysia*.)

Aug. 17—President Sukarno declares that the U.S. cannot be friendly with both Indonesia and the Federation of Malaysia, in his *Merdeka* (Independence Day) speech.

Aug. 27—Sukarno reorganizes his 77-member cabinet; a Communist is added to the cabinet ranks.

ITALY

Aug. 1—The senate approves, 163-120, the economic stabilization program of Premier Aldo Moro. The new program calls for increased taxes and other austerity measures.

Aug. 6—The Chamber of Deputies votes approval of Moro's new cabinet and austerity program.

Aug. 7—President Antonio Segni is stricken by a cerebral stroke.

Aug. 10—Senate President Cesare Merzagora temporarily assumes Segni's duties.

Aug. 21—The leader of the Italian Communist party, Palmiro Togliatti, dies.

Aug. 26—Luigi Longo, deputy secretary of the Italian Communist party, is elected to succeed Togliatti as party secretary.

LAOS

Aug. 1—Foreign Secretary R. A. Butler returns to London after a 5-day visit.

Aug. 9—Premier Souvanna Phouma, in a letter to Prince Souphanouvong, the head of the Pathet Lao, proposes August 24 for the date of their meeting in Paris; this also marks Phouma's formal acceptance of the Paris site.

Aug. 21—Premier Phouma arrives in Paris for talks; he represents the Laotian neutralists.

Aug. 25—Prince Souphanouvong, leftist Laotian leader, arrives in Paris.

Aug. 26—Prince Boun Oum, representing right-wing elements, arrives in Paris.

Aug. 28—Premier Phouma meets with Prince Souphanouvong. Phouma states that preliminary talks rather than an official meeting will be held.

LEBANON

Aug. 18—The parliament elects Minister of Education Charles Helou as President; he will succeed President Fuad Chehab, whose 6-year term expires in September.

LIBYA

Aug. 22—Libyan Premier Mahmud Mun-tasser announces that the U.S. has agreed in principle to give up the Wheelus Air Force Base. The Premier states that Britain has also agreed in principle to evacuate her bases and posts in Libya.

POLAND

Aug. 7—The Chairman of the State Council (titular president), Aleksander Zawadzki, dies.

Aug. 12—Edward Ochab is elected to succeed Zawadzki, at a special parliamentary session.

TURKEY

Aug. 8—It is reported that Turkey has announced an "open policy" of deporting and harassing Greek nationals in Istanbul, in retaliation for Greek-Turkish differences over Cyprus. (See also *British Commonwealth, Cyprus*.)

Aug. 28—In Turkey, crowds demonstrate for the second day in front of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. Demonstrators also damage the Greek Embassy. Some 10,000 Turks protest because they believe the U.S. is sympathetic to Greek demands concerning Cyprus.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Czechoslovakia*)

Aug. 3—*Tass* (official press agency) publishes a statement by Premier Khrushchev in which he urges that an "early German peace settlement" be negotiated to improve East-West relations. His statement is made in an interview commemorating the

nuclear test ban outlawing explosions in the atmosphere, in space and under water.

Aug. 10—An announcement, in an editorial in *Pravda* (Soviet party newspaper), discloses that the Soviet Union has invited 25 Communist parties to meet in Moscow in December to arrange for a world conference in the summer of 1965. (See also *China*.)

Aug. 11—A decree of the Soviet Communist party and the government is made public today in which it is announced that the projected 11-year program of primary and secondary education has been reduced to 10 years; since 1962-1963, there has been an 8-year compulsory education system. The new program is scheduled for completion by the end of the 1965-1966 school year.

Aug. 14—*Tass* (official press agency) discloses that in a statement sent to all African and Asian countries, the Soviet Union eased its insistence on participating in the second African-Asian conference scheduled for next year. The statement declares that the Soviet Union will not make an "embarrassing" issue over an invitation to the meeting. Communist China has opposed such an invitation for Moscow.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Aug. 16—In Cairo, U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser confers with visiting King Hussein of Jordan. They discuss Middle East politics and unity.

UNITED STATES, THE

Agriculture

Aug. 24—President of the National Farmers Organization Oren Lee Staley declares that livestock deliveries have dropped sharply since N.F.O. members halted deliveries last week. The farmers' action has been taken in protest against low livestock prices.

Civil Rights

(See *Segregation and Supreme Court*)

Economy

Aug. 6—The Labor Department reports that in July the unemployment rate declined to less than 5 per cent (4.9 per cent) for the first time in 5 years. From a total civilian labor force of 76.2 million persons some 72.4 million were employed.

Foreign Policy

Aug. 4—In a television broadcast at 11:30 p.m., President Lyndon B. Johnson tells the U.S. people that he has ordered reprisals against North Vietnamese PT boats and "certain supporting facilities" following a second round of attacks on U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. Johnson declares that no expansion of the war in South Vietnam is contemplated, and that the U.S. representative to the U.N., Adlai Stevenson, will bring the issue before the Security Council. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Aug. 6—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant is welcomed to the White House by President Johnson; during his one-day visit, Thant will receive the ceremonies extended to a visiting chief of state.

Aug. 16—It is reported that Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies has sent a letter to President Johnson warning that Australia will halt 6 principal imports from the U.S. if a bill to reduce Australian beef exports to the U.S. is passed by Congress. The bill is currently before the U.S. Congress.

Henry Cabot Lodge, former Ambassador to South Vietnam, arrives in France on the first leg of his journey to West European nations to explain U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

Aug. 21—Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield warns against U.S. "unilateral participation" in the Congo.

Government

Aug. 3—U.S. Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel tells the National Urban League that the Government will cut off federal funds to schools refusing to desegregate.

Aug. 4—The Senate and House approve a \$558 million yearly salary increase for 1.7 million government employees, including white collar workers, post office employees, federal judges, congressmen, cabinet and sub-cabinet officers. Senators, representatives and federal judges will receive a \$7,500 annual increase.

By approving a \$46,752,051,000 appropriation, the Senate completes congressional action on a bill to provide funds for operating and equipping U.S. defense forces.

Aug. 5—The Senate confirms the interim appointment of Pierre Salinger, who will fill the vacancy left by the demise of California Democratic Senator Clair Engle. Salinger is currently campaigning for election to Engle's seat.

President Johnson asks Congress to pass a joint resolution approving "all necessary action" to defend U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.

Aug. 6—The Senate approves a bill regulating over-the-counter securities. Companies whose stocks are traded over the counter, whose assets are \$1 million or more, and whose stockholders total over 750 will have to file financial reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The House approved the bill yesterday.

Aug. 7—The House and Senate approve a joint resolution giving prior sanction to any measures taken by President Johnson to repel aggression against U.S. forces. The resolution also approves any presidential action taken to help any Seato member maintain its freedom.

Aug. 10—Attorney General Robert Kennedy announces that an Office of Criminal Justice will be created within the Justice Department.

Aug. 11—The Senate completes congressional action on the Administration's \$947.5 million anti-poverty program, and sends the bill to the White House.

The House completes congressional action on the food stamp plan enabling needy families to buy food using stamps

bought at a discount, to bridge the difference between ability to pay and an adequate diet. The food stamp plan will be available to all communities desiring it.

Aug. 13—In the Senate, Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois offers an amendment to the foreign aid bill allowing states to delay the legislative reapportionment required by the Supreme Court decision of June 15, until a constitutional amendment can be passed providing that one house of a state legislature may be districted on the basis of criteria other than population.

At a luncheon for university and college educators, President Johnson discloses that he will appoint Sargent Shriver of the Peace Corps as head of the anti-poverty program.

President Johnson signs a \$2.4 billion bill for road construction.

Aug. 14—President Johnson signs the federal pay rise bill.

Aug. 18—The House completes congressional action on a bill to provide \$15 million to the Seneca Indians to compensate them for reservation lands that will be flooded by a reservoir. The bill goes to the White House.

In the Senate, a proposal to suspend the equal time provisions of the Federal Communications Act during the presidential campaign is voted down. In 1960, Congress suspended the equal time provision for political candidates; this suspension made possible the Kennedy-Nixon television debates.

The House and Senate approve a compromise bill to impose quotas on imports of beef, veal and mutton if they total over 900 million pounds in 1965; in effect, meat imports will be reduced 15 per cent below last year's level.

President Johnson signs a bill extending the Hill-Burton hospital construction program for 5 years.

Aug. 19—President Johnson offers a skit and musical program, called a "Salute to Congress," on the White House lawn for Congressmen and other government offi-

cials. Johnson praises "this session of Congress" for approving "more major legislation . . . than any other session in this century or the last."

The Senate completes congressional action and sends to the White House a bill authorizing a special interest-equalization tax on foreign securities purchased by U.S. citizens.

The House and Senate approve a \$1.1 billion housing bill that extends for one year urban renewal and public housing programs; the bill also establishes a new program giving landlords incentive to improve slum properties.

Aug. 20—Johnson signs the anti-poverty bill.

The Senate and House approve a \$1.5 billion bill for the construction of military bases.

President Johnson signs a bill regulating companies whose stocks are sold over the counter. Johnson swears in Manuel F. Cohen as the new Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; he succeeds William L. Cary.

Johnson signs a bill authorizing free legal counsel for needy defendants being tried in federal courts on misdemeanor or felony charges. Court-appointed attorneys in these cases will be paid by the federal courts.

Aug. 21—The Senate completes congressional action on a bill to establish a 4,300 acre national park on Fire Island for public recreational uses. The bill is sent to the President.

Congress completes action on a \$287.6 million program to provide federal aid for nurses' training during a 5-year period.

The Senate completes congressional action on a bill creating a National Council of the Arts; the bill is sent to the White House.

The Congress adjourns for the Democratic National Convention.

Aug. 26—President Johnson signs legislation requiring the federal government to sell nuclear fuels to privately-owned atomic power plants, ending the 18-year govern-

ment monopoly of fissionable materials, such as enriched uranium, used as fuels in atomic reactors. Nuclear fuels, heretofore leased or given to private owners of atomic power plants, are to be privately owned after June, 1973.

Labor

Aug. 13—The Florida East Coast Railway strike enters its 570th day.

Aug. 17—The Ford Motor Company, the Chrysler Corporation and General Motors Corporation separately offer new 3-year contracts to the United Automobile Workers Union; the new contracts would increase wages and insurance and pension benefits.

James R. Hoffa, president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, is sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and is fined \$10,000 for defrauding the Teamsters' pension fund. Six co-defendants are also fined and sentenced.

Aug. 20—U.A.W. councils at General Motors, Ford and Chrysler reject the companies' contract proposals.

Aug. 24—A decision by a New York State Supreme Court Justice upholds a ruling by the State Commission for Human Rights that Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association has excluded Negroes from membership. The Justice's ruling contains an agreement, previously reached by all parties, that Local 28 will end its practice of favoring the relatives of union members for membership; the judge's ruling orders that the agreement be implemented.

Aug. 26—U.A.W. President Walter Reuther announces that unless new contracts are negotiated, the U.A.W. will strike against the Chrysler Corporation on September 9.

Military

(See also *Libya*)

Aug. 1—At a meeting with space scientists, President Johnson is informed that lunar pictures taken by Ranger 7 indicate that a lunar landing is possible.

Aug. 15—President Johnson announces that a new light airplane will be developed for

use in counterinsurgency programs, such as jungle warfare in South Vietnam.

Aug. 25—The Atomic Energy Commission declares that nuclear weapons production has been cut back, that is, the stockpile of U.S. weapons is increasing at "a reduced rate."

Politics

Aug. 3—The Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations issues a statement denouncing the Republican party platform.

Aug. 6—Senator Barry Goldwater and his vice-presidential running mate, William E. Miller, confer in Gettysburg with former President Dwight Eisenhower and former Vice-President Richard Nixon. Following the meeting, Goldwater condemns the Ku Klux Klan and declares he does not want that group's support. Previously Miller and the Republican National Chairman, Dean Burch, said that they would accept the support of Klan members.

Aug. 12—At a unity conference of Republican leaders in Hershey, Pennsylvania, Goldwater denounces "character assassins" and vigilantes. He voices support for the U.N., social security, and civil rights.

Aug. 18—N.Y. Senator Kenneth Keating (Republican) announces that he will seek re-election; he reaffirms his refusal to support the Republican national ticket.

Aug. 19—An audit, by an accounting firm, of the wealth possessed by President Johnson and his family values it at some \$3.5 million, based on original purchase prices of properties and stocks.

Aug. 22—The governors of Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi refuse to attend a White House meeting of Democratic governors.

Aug. 24—The 34th Democratic National Convention opens in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

The Alabama delegation takes its seats at the convention after its credentials have been challenged. Only 6 delegates and 7 alternates in the Alabama delegation have

signed the loyalty oath agreeing to support the Democratic nominees.

Aug. 25—The Democratic convention, by voice vote, agrees on a compromise to seat the Mississippi delegation plus 2 members of the contesting bi-racial Mississippi Freedom Democratic party. The Mississippi delegation withdraws; it refuses to sign the loyalty pledge. The Democratic party platform is read and adopted. The platform condemns extremist groups, specifically the Communist party, the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society; it upholds presidential control of nuclear arms.

At Gracie Mansion in New York City (Mayor Wagner's official residence), Attorney General Robert Kennedy announces that he will run for the U.S. Senate on the Democratic ticket in New York, although he is not a resident.

Aug. 26—The Mississippi and Alabama delegations to the Democratic Convention refuse to participate and many depart; 9 Alabama and 3 Mississippi delegates, who signed the loyalty pledge, remain.

The Democratic National Convention nominates Johnson as its presidential nominee by acclamation. President Johnson appears before the convention and announces that Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey is his choice for vice-president. Humphrey is nominated by acclamation.

Aug. 27—Senator Humphrey, in his acceptance speech, sharply criticizes Senator Barry Goldwater and invites responsible Republicans to rally to Johnson's side.

President Johnson delivers his acceptance speech in which he emphasizes a strong and responsible America; he attacks "the forces of bigotry and fear and smear."

Aug. 28—The Democratic National Committee reelects John M. Bailey as chairman.

Segregation

Aug. 2—The Southern Regional Council reports that Negro voter registration increased by some 500,000 persons since the last presidential election.

Aug. 4—In Jersey City, New Jersey, racial violence erupts for the third night. Police

clash with Negroes throwing Molotov cocktails in the streets.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation locates 3 bodies buried at a dam site near Philadelphia, Mississippi.

Aug. 5—An examination of the 3 bodies at the University of Mississippi Medical Center identifies them as the 3 civil rights workers missing since June: Michael H. Schwerner, James Chaney and Andrew Goodman.

Jersey City Mayor Thomas Whelan meets with clergymen on settling Negro grievances.

A federal district judge orders 17 restaurants and motels in St. Augustine, Florida, to admit Negroes, in accord with the Civil Rights Law.

Aug. 6—The F.B.I. arrests 4 men in connection with the murder of Negro educator Lemuel A. Penn in Georgia on July 11.

New York Mayor Robert Wagner meets with the steering committee of the United Council of Harlem Organizations (Unity Council). He agrees to the Council's demand for more Negro policemen on the force, and to a long-range plan for improving the plight of the Negroes.

Aug. 9—In Dallas, Texas, a white teen-ager is shot and killed during one of 2 racial incidents.

Aug. 10—Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black denies a petition to delay enforcement of the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 until the act's constitutionality can be tested in the Supreme Court. The Heart of Atlanta Motel Corporation and the Pickrick Restaurant in Atlanta must admit Negro customers.

Aug. 12—In the Negro district of Paterson, New Jersey, sporadic violence erupts. In Elizabeth, New Jersey, Negro rioting erupts for the second night; demonstrators toss Molotov cocktails at policemen.

Aug. 13—Lester Maddox, owner of the Pickrick Restaurant, closes his establishment, after receiving a federal court order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for defying a federal court order

to desegregate. Maddox will not serve Negroes.

Aug. 14—New York Police Commissioner Michael Murphy appoints Captain Lloyd Sealy, a Negro, as a precinct commander in Harlem.

Aug. 17—In the suburban community of Dixmoor, Illinois, Negroes riot and fight with police. Some 50 persons are injured in the fighting.

Two Negro boys and 1 girl attend a white high school in Greensburg, Louisiana, under a federal court order that the 11th and 12th grades in St. Helena Parish must be desegregated.

Aug. 25—A Georgia grand jury indicts 3 white men for the murder of Lemuel Penn.

Aug. 29—In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, some 125 city blocks are ordered quarantined following a night of rioting in "the Jungle," a primarily Negro neighborhood. The riot began when a Negro policeman asked a Negro driver to move her car.

Aug. 31—In Biloxi, Mississippi, 16 Negro first graders attend classes in 4 previously segregated schools.

Supreme Court

Aug. 26—The Supreme Court agrees to hear arguments on a case involving the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it convenes for its fall term on October 5.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Aug. 2—The U.S. Defense Department announces that 3 North Vietnamese PT boats fired torpedoes and 37 mm. shells at the *U.S.S. Maddox*, a destroyer patrolling in the Gulf of Tonkin some 30 miles from the North Vietnamese coast. The PT boats are forced to withdraw by U.S. fire.

Aug. 3—It is announced that President Johnson has ordered the Navy to retaliate against any further attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin. Another destroyer is ordered to the Gulf of Tonkin and air patrol is provided.

Premier Nguyen Khanh declares that the U.S. must take a strong stand in Asia and prove it is not a "paper tiger."

Aug. 4—The U.S. Defense Department announces that North Vietnamese PT boats have attacked 2 U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, the *U.S.S. Maddox* and the *U.S.S. C. Turner Joy*.

U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, in a nationwide television broadcast just before midnight, declares that he has ordered retaliatory attacks on North Vietnamese facilities.

Aug. 5—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announces that in a 5-hour attack early today, U.S. bombers attacked 4 North Vietnamese PT boat bases and an important oil storage installation; some 25 North Vietnam PT boats have been destroyed. Two U.S. planes are reported lost.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announces, at a news conference, that the U.S. is sending reinforcements of men, ships and planes to Southeast Asia.

Speaking at Syracuse University, President Johnson warns that the U.S. will not permit "the present aggressions of the Government of North Vietnam" to go unchallenged.

Aug. 6—The North Vietnamese government denies that an attack was made on August 4 against 2 U.S. destroyers. North Vietnam asks the members of the 1954 Geneva conference to halt U.S. aggression.

Aug. 7—The U.N. Security Council invites South and North Vietnam to testify before it on the U.S. complaint of "deliberate aggression" by North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin.

The U.S. Congress approves a resolution authorizing the President to take whatever steps are necessary to thwart Communist aggression.

Premier Khanh decrees a state of emergency in South Vietnam under which controls on travel, press censorship, regional curfews, and other measures will be introduced.

Aug. 8—*Izvestia* (Soviet government newspaper) publishes a speech by Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in which he warns that the Soviet Union will fight if necessary to support other Communist

countries; he condemns U.S. actions against North Vietnam.

Aug. 9—The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry rejects a U.N. Security Council request that both North and South Vietnam provide the U.N. Security Council with information pertaining to the U.S.-North Vietnamese conflict.

Aug. 16—Leaders of South Vietnamese troops vote a new constitution providing for a presidential system of government like that of the U.S. The army leaders elect Nguyen Khanh as president; Khanh succeeds Major General Duong Van Minh as chief of state. The Military Revolutionary Council, the supreme ruling power established by officers who overthrew the government of Ngo Dinh Diem last year, announces the reorganization. The constitution gives Khanh dictatorial powers.

Aug. 18—U.S. military advisers report that in a 3-day fight in the Mekong delta, South Vietnamese forces killed some 280 Vietcong (pro-Communist) rebels.

Aug. 21—Military sources report that South Vietnamese troops were ambushed yesterday by Vietcong forces; some 20 South Vietnamese soldiers were killed, 65 were wounded, and 135 are missing. Four U.S. advisers were also killed.

Aug. 23—Students in South Vietnam attack the national radio station in Saigon in protest against a broadcast declaring student grievances against the government have been satisfied. Some 3,000 Buddhists meet on the outskirts of Saigon at their national pagoda and demand religious freedom.

Aug. 25—President Khanh, in a communiqué broadcast over the government radio station, announces that he will relax rigid government control. Following the broadcast, students demonstrate and call for the ouster of Khanh.

In Danang, Buddhists attack Catholic residents.

The Military Revolutionary Council votes to withdraw the constitution of August 16. A proclamation is issued declaring

that the Council will elect a head of state and then dissolve itself. Protest demonstrations by students and Buddhists continue.

Aug. 26—Buddhist-Catholic fighting continues in the city of Danang. A Buddhist leader states his approval of the Council's decision to disband itself. Buddhists have resented the influence of the Catholic minority in the Diem and Khanh regimes.

Aug. 27—Government troops clash with thousands of demonstrators attempting to attack military headquarters. The Military Revolutionary Council issues a communiqué in which it announces the formation of a 3-man military junta to govern until a national convention is called within 2 months; Major General Nguyen Khanh is named to the junta.

Aug. 28—Following a day of rioting, a government spokesman declares that a Committee of Unification, composed of military and civilian personnel, will replace the Military Revolutionary Council.

Aug. 29—The military triumvirate sets up a caretaker regime with Nguyen Xuan Oanh as acting premier for a 2-month period. Acting Premier Oanh announces that Khanh has suffered a mental and physical breakdown.

Aug. 30—Some 50,000 Catholics join in a funeral procession for 6 Catholics killed during religious conflicts last week.

A government communiqué charges that some 449 persons were killed in the street demonstrations; it blames Communist infiltrators for stirring up Buddhist-Catholic friction.

Aug. 31—The U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Maxwell D. Taylor, flies to Dalat, the resort where General Khanh is recuperating; they talk for 2 hours. Afterwards, Taylor declares that Khanh is "rested and recovered" and expects to resume the premiership shortly.

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